G.R. No. 27019, March 4, 1927
CLEMENCIA GRAÑO, Petitioner, vs. HON. ISIDRO PAREDES, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, and ESTANISLAO REYES, Respondents.

SEBASTIANA MARTINEZ ET AL., Intervenors.

FACTS

In a prior case (*Martinez et al. vs. Graño et al.*), the trial court issued an order on October 9, 1925, dissolving a receivership and directing the receiver, Estanislao Reyes, to surrender the property in litigation to the parties in interest. This order was affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal (G.R. No. 25437). However, in its decision, the Supreme Court included a paragraph stating that if the receiver’s accounts showed he had paid more for the property’s conservation than he received, such balance “should be recognized as a lawful claim constituting a lien on the property.” The trial judge, Hon. Isidro Paredes, interpreted the word “lien” as granting the receiver a “right of retention,” allowing him to remain in possession of the property until his claim was settled. Consequently, the judge refused to execute the order to oust the receiver and deliver the property. Clemencia Graño and intervenors (the Martinez parties) then filed this petition for mandamus to compel the judge to execute the dissolution order.

ISSUE

Did the Supreme Court’s use of the word “lien” in its prior decision confer upon the receiver a right to retain possession of the property pending the settlement of his accounts?

RULING

No. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus. It clarified that the term “lien” as used in its prior decision did not mean a “right of retention” that would allow the receiver to keep possession. The Court explained that “lien” in its broader sense refers to a charge or liability on property to secure a debt, more accurately translated as “*gravamen*” in Spanish, and does not necessarily include a right to retain possession, especially concerning real property. The essence of the prior appeal was precisely the receiver’s claim to a right of retention, which the Court had already denied. Upon the dissolution of the receivership, the receiver’s authority to possess the property terminated. The trial judge’s interpretation was erroneous. The Court ordered the respondent judge to oust receiver Estanislao Reyes and cause the delivery of the property to the proper parties. Costs were imposed on the respondent Reyes.