G.R. No. 269598 , April 02, 2025
RIZALINO B. ABELLA, TEODORO C. ABELLA, AND ROMILDA S. AMAGO, PETITIONERS, VS. ATTY. SERGIO C. SUMAYOD, JANE A. PICA, ANNALIZA YU, AND PETRON CORP., INC., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) allowed the probate of the last will and testament of Josefina Escosora Abella. Paragraph 5 of the will bequeathed Josefina’s “just share from the Pawing, Palo, Properties” to certain named devisees, including Soledad Amago, Conrada C. Abella, and Anesia Abella. Petitioners Rizalino Abella, Teodoro Abella, and Romilda Amago are the surviving heirs of these devisees. After discovering the probate decision, petitioners contacted the named executor, Atty. Sergio Sumayod, and the property caretaker, Jane Pica, to demand distribution of the Pawing, Palo Properties pursuant to the will. Their demands were refused.
Petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Appoint Special Executor and Execute the Will before the RTC, seeking to replace the executor and compel the execution of Paragraph 5. The RTC denied the motion. It ruled that the testamentary disposition of the Pawing, Palo Properties was intrinsically void because Josefina did not own them; one lot was registered in the names of other individuals, and another was in the name of the “Heirs of Jose Abella.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s denial. Petitioners elevated the case via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the RTC, in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, correctly declared the specific testamentary disposition in Paragraph 5 of the will void for involving properties not owned by the testatrix.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the lower courts’ rulings. The probate court has limited jurisdiction and its primary duty is to ascertain the due execution of the will—i.e., the testator’s soundness of mind and compliance with formalities. Generally, it cannot rule on the validity of specific provisions or the ownership of properties disposed of. However, a recognized exception exists when a provision is void on its face. The Court applied this exception.
The legal logic is clear: a testator can only dispose of property owned at the time of death. The will itself identified the Pawing, Palo Properties by their titles. One title was in the names of five other persons, not Josefina. The other was in the name of “Heirs of Jose Abella, represented by Josefina Abella,” which signifies she held it in a fiduciary capacity for the heirs, not in her personal capacity. Since the face of the will and the attached titles showed Josefina had no ownership interest, the disposition was inherently invalid. The probate court correctly pierced through the general rule and declared Paragraph 5 void ab initio with respect to those properties. Consequently, the properties fall into the estate’s intestate mass for distribution by the rules of legal succession, not by the will. The appointment of a special executor to implement this void provision was therefore unnecessary.