G.R. No. L-26848 August 17, 1981
Caridad O. de Gallego, petitioner-appellant, vs. Land Authority (Formerly Land Tenure Administration), oppositor-appellee.

FACTS

Petitioner Caridad O. de Gallego is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Parañaque, Rizal, covered by TCT No. 46402. The title contains three encumbrances imposed by the government when the land, originally part of a government-acquired tract for subdivision into residential lots for the landless, was transferred. Condition No. 1 prohibits sale, assignment, encumbrance, mortgage, or transfer within five years without the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources’ written consent. Conditions No. 2 and 3 perpetually restrict conveyance except by hereditary succession to persons who are not landless and authorize reversion to the government for any violation. Petitioner filed a petition for cancellation, arguing that Condition No. 1 had lapsed after five years and that Conditions No. 2 and 3 had lost their purpose because the area had become commercial, fronting Manila Bay, with properties like a nightclub, making the land prohibitively expensive for the landless and hindering economic development.
The Land Authority opposed the cancellation of Conditions No. 2 and 3, asserting they are perpetual and any transaction requires its written consent. The Court of First Instance of Rizal denied the petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, citing that the Land Authority did not oppose a similar petition in another case involving commercial property and that she acquired the land as the highest bidder in a foreclosure sale, not as a landless individual. The motion was denied, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the perpetual encumbrances (Conditions No. 2 and 3) on the certificate of title should be cancelled due to a change in the character of the property from residential to commercial and the alleged loss of the original legislative purpose.

RULING

The Supreme Court modified the lower court’s orders, cancelling only Condition No. 1 as its five-year period had expired, and upheld Conditions No. 2 and 3. The legal logic is grounded in statutory interpretation and the separation of powers. The encumbrances were imposed pursuant to a specific law (presumably related to land reform and distribution). The Court emphasized that such statutory restrictions can only be altered or removed by the legislative branch through repeal or amendment of the law itself. The executive branch’s prior inconsistent action in another case (not opposing a similar petition) does not repeal the law or justify its non-observance, as laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and violation is not excused by disuse or practice to the contrary under Article 7 of the Civil Code.
The Court rejected petitioner’s arguments based on changed conditions (commercialization, prohibitive cost, economic deterrence). It held that the judiciary is not concerned with the wisdom, necessity, or propriety of the law; assessing whether the original purpose has been outlived is a legislative, not a judicial, function. The restrictions, being statutory in origin, remain binding regardless of changes in the neighborhood’s character or the property’s value. The petition was partly granted only as to the time-bound condition.