G.R. No. 26757, October 11, 1927
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CIRILO SANDAL, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed an information charging Cirilo Sandal with violating Section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code of the United States (Act of Congress of March 4, 1909). The information alleged that on or about July 26, 1925, in Camp Stotsenburg, Pampanga, the accused voluntarily and illegally entered and penetrated the military reserve without permission and despite an express prohibition from the camp authorities. The accused filed a general demurrer. The Court of First Instance sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case, ruling that Section 45 of the U.S. Federal Criminal Code was not in force in the Philippine Islands. The Government, through the Attorney-General, appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether Section 45 of the U.S. Federal Criminal Code (Act of March 4, 1909) is applicable and in force in the Philippine Islands.
2. Whether the information filed against the accused sufficiently charges an offense under the said law.

RULING

1. On the Applicability of the Law: YES. The Supreme Court held that Section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code is in force in the Philippines. While general territorial extension laws (like R.S. 1891) do not apply to the Philippines, laws of the United States that are inherently of general application to specific subjects, particularly those concerning the U.S. Army and Navy as agencies of national sovereignty, are effective wherever these forces are lawfully stationed. This provision, which grants police power to authorities in charge of military reservations, accompanies the military authorities and applies to reservations regardless of location. The Court cited the precedent in *Tan Te vs. Bell* (27 Phil. 354), which upheld the force of another U.S. statute (R.S. 3748) in the Philippines as incident to the Army establishment.

2. On the Sufficiency of the Information: NO. The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the dismissal but on a different ground. Examining the information, the Court found it failed to allege facts constituting the offense defined in Section 45. The law penalizes two acts: (a) going upon a reservation for a purpose prohibited by law or regulation, or (b) reentering or being found within the reservation after having been removed or ordered not to reenter. The information merely alleged that the accused “entered and penetrated” the camp without permission and despite a prohibition. It did not allege he entered for a prohibited purpose, nor did it explicitly allege that he reentered after having been previously removed or ordered not to reenter. A first entry, without more, is not an offense under the statute. The defect was amendable. The Court noted that a written notification ordering the accused not to reenter (dated July 23, 1925) existed in the record, which could form the basis for a proper charge of reentry.

DISPOSITIVE:
The appealed order was AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. It was affirmed insofar as it declared the information insufficient. It was reversed insofar as it ordered the dismissal of the case and cancellation of the bond. The case was REMANDED to the trial court with instructions for the fiscal to file a new or amended information in conformity with the law, with the accused to be held for trial.