G.R. No. L-26694 December 18, 1973
NELITA MORENO VDA. DE BACALING, petitioner, vs. HECTOR LAGUDA, HON. VALERIO ROVIRA, Judge, Court of First Instance and HON. JUDGE ROSENDO BALTAZAR, Judge, City Court of Iloilo, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Nelita Moreno Vda. de Bacaling, constructed a residential house on a lot owned by private respondent Hector Laguda, with his acquiescence, and paid a monthly rental. Due to non-payment of rentals from July 1959 to September 1961, Laguda filed an ejectment case (Civil Case No. 6823) in the Iloilo City Court. After several unsuccessful legal challenges by the petitioner in higher courts, the parties entered into a compromise agreement on July 29, 1964, which was approved by the City Court. The agreement stipulated that the petitioner would vacate the premises and remove her house by December 31, 1966, and pay monthly rent until that date. It further provided that failure to comply within a 50-day grace period would entitle Laguda to immediate execution.
The petitioner failed to comply, prompting Laguda to move for execution, which was granted. The petitioner, having been discharged as judicial administratrix of her late husband’s estate, opposed the execution and subsequent demolition order, arguing she was no longer in control of estate funds, that she was entitled to reimbursement as a builder in good faith for the house valued at P35,000, and that the guardian ad litem for her minor children was not notified. The City Court issued a Special Order of Demolition on June 30, 1966, subject to approval by the Court of First Instance (CFI) presiding over the estate proceedings. The CFI, through Judge Valerio Rovira, approved the demolition order on August 25, 1966.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judges committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing and approving the orders for execution and demolition of the petitioner’s house.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the finality and binding effect of the compromise agreement. A compromise, once approved by the court, has the force of res judicata and is immediately executory. The petitioner voluntarily entered into the agreement, which contained a specific waiver of her right under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to delay execution for one year. By this waiver, she contractually renounced the very period she later sought to invoke, thereby estopping her from challenging the immediate execution.
The Court rejected the petitioner’s claim as a builder in good faith. This defense was deemed waived and barred by the compromise judgment, which constituted a final settlement of all claims related to the ejectment. The argument regarding lack of notice to the guardian ad litem was also unavailing, as the compromise was entered into by the petitioner in her capacity as the then-judicial administratrix, binding the estate. The subsequent change in administration did not invalidate the agreement. The Court condemned the petitioner’s series of litigations as dilatory tactics that misuse judicial remedies, emphasizing that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal and is only proper for lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, neither of which was present. The orders were a straightforward enforcement of a final and executory judgment based on a valid compromise.