GR 26539; (February, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-26539 February 28, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GAUDENCIO VERA, ET AL., defendants. TAGUMPAY A. NANADIEGO, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
On February 23, 1955, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon charging Tagumpay Nanadiego and others with the complex crime of Kidnapping with Murder, allegedly committed on February 13, 1945. The case was subsequently referred to the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission. In a decision dated June 12, 1956, the Commission held it had no jurisdiction, as none of the accused admitted guilt, and amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. It remanded the case to the trial court. This order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and ultimately by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-18184 on January 31, 1963, which ruled that invoking amnesty requires a prior admission of guilt as it is a plea of confession and avoidance.
Subsequently, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Amnesty Commission, acting under Proclamation No. 8, conducted its own proceedings. On September 30, 1964, the AFP Commission granted amnesty to Nanadiego, finding the offense was committed in furtherance of the resistance movement. Relying on this grant, Nanadiego filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court. On January 23, 1965, the court granted the motion and dismissed the case against him. The prosecution appealed, arguing the AFP Commission’s grant was void for lack of jurisdiction, as the Supreme Court had previously ruled amnesty could not apply without an admission of guilt.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the criminal case against Tagumpay Nanadiego based on the amnesty granted by the AFP Amnesty Commission.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order of dismissal. The legal logic proceeds from the nature and effects of amnesty. Amnesty is a public act that looks backward, abolishes the offense itself, and places the grantee in the same legal position as if no offense had been committed. Once amnesty is granted and established, the right to its benefits cannot be waived, as it involves a public interest that the person be regarded not as a criminal but, under the proclamation, as innocent.
The Court clarified that its prior ruling in G.R. No. L-18184—that amnesty requires an admission of guilt—was made in the specific context of the proceedings before the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission. That ruling did not preclude a subsequent, valid grant by the proper and separate AFP Amnesty Commission, which was duly constituted under Proclamation No. 8. The AFP Commission conducted its own investigation, found the acts were committed in pursuit of the resistance movement, and validly extended amnesty. This grant extinguished Nanadiego’s criminal liability under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly recognized this extinction as a ground for dismissal under the Rules of Court. Furthermore, remanding the case for trial would be a futile exercise, as the amnesty had obliterated the very offense charged.
