G.R. No. L-26167 January 30, 1970
THE HEIRS OF B. A. CRUMB, namely: HENRY WILLIAM, ARTHUR, MARY, EVA and JAMES, the latter being represented by his wife CORAZON JAVELONA, and children: EVELYN, STELLA, JAMES, JR., and GLORY all surnamed CRUMB and HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and, ESTEBAN, MONTERO, SANTIAGO HEBOSO, SILVESTRE ALEJANDRO, FELISA MORENO, TECLA VDA. DE MORENO, GREGORIO ECRAMAN, PAZ VEGAFRIA CRISTETA SOTTO, WILFREDO SOTTO, HONORATO SOTTO, MONICA TANGAL, AGUSTIN EFHAN, SIXTO DUMAGAN, MOISES CALLANO, ALBERTO SISMUNDO, FELIPE RENTOR, ALICIA ARES, REGINO BATONMALAKI, JUANITO CASILAC, ESTEBAN REYES, MELITONA CASILAC, FRANCISCO UBONGEN, DOMINADOR UBONGEN, JOSE UBONGEN, ANTOLIN ALFORQUE, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

This case involves the execution of a final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 344 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, entitled “The Heirs of B.A. Crumb, etc. vs. Margarito Rodriguez, et al.,” wherein the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. L-7954 (March 31, 1959), reversed the trial court and ordered the defendants-appellees to vacate the premises and restore possession to the plaintiffs-appellants, the Heirs of Crumb. After remand, the trial court issued orders for execution and, upon the defendants’ continued refusal to vacate, issued an order for forcible ejectment and demolition. Subsequently, on January 15, 1965, the Crumb heirs filed a motion for contempt against some original defendants and against other persons, including the 39 private respondents herein, who were not parties to the original action but were found by the trial court to be privies of some defendants. In an order dated June 10, 1965, the trial court declared 53 persons, including the 39 respondents, in contempt, fined them P200 each, directed them to vacate their occupations, and ordered the sheriff to demolish their houses. The 39 respondents and 13 original defendants filed a notice of appeal. The trial court, in its order of August 28, 1965, ruled that the contempt aspect was appealable but that the execution/eviction order was unappealable, and ordered the sheriff to execute the eviction and demolition. Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration (September 17, 1965), the 39 respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which treated it also as a petition for mandamus. The Court of Appeals, in its decision of February 11, 1966, sustained the petition, set aside the trial court’s orders insofar as they held the eviction order unappealable, and commanded the trial judge to give due course to the respondents’ appeal. The Heirs of Crumb then filed this petition for certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ decision.

ISSUE

Whether the private respondents, having perfected an appeal (by notice of appeal) from the trial court’s order finding them in contempt of court, are also deemed to have properly appealed from the portion of the same order directing them to vacate the land and for the demolition of their houses, such that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that portion unappealable and ordering its immediate execution.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the appeal from the finding of contempt necessarily carried with it the appeal from the concomitant order to vacate and for demolition. The two portions of the order were interrelated, as the contempt finding was coercive to enforce the eviction, and both arose from a single motion for contempt. To split the order and require separate modes of appeal (criminal procedure for the fine, civil procedure for the eviction) would lead to a multiplicity of appeals from a single order, which is not warranted by public policy. The Court clarified that the appeal is limited to the 39 respondents who were not original defendants, as the original defendants are concluded by the final judgment. However, the perfection of the appeal does not automatically stay execution of the eviction order; the respondents must file the bond required under Section 10 of Revised Rule 71 to stay execution pending appeal. This aspect was left for determination by the trial court. The Supreme Court did not pass upon the Court of Appeals’ finding that the writ of execution was issued beyond the five-year period, as this finding presupposes the respondents were not privies to the original defendants.