G.R. No. 260374 / 260426, June 28, 2022
FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., ET AL., RESPONDENTS. / BONIFACIO PARABUAC ILAGAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioners filed petitions seeking the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Romualdez Marcos, Jr. (PEMJ) under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. They alleged that PEMJ made false material representations in his COC by declaring he was eligible to run for President and that he had never been found guilty of any offense carrying the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office. This claim was based on a consolidated judgment of the Court of Appeals which found PEMJ guilty of failing to file his income tax returns for the years 1982 to 1985 under the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). The CA ordered him to pay deficiency taxes with interest and fines, but did not impose any penalty of perpetual disqualification. Petitioners argued that under Section 286 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended, the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office is an automatic and inevitable accessory penalty arising solely from the fact of conviction for any crime penalized under the NIRC, and therefore was deemed written into his conviction, rendering his COC declarations false.

ISSUE

Whether the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office was automatically imposed by operation of law upon PEMJ’s conviction for violations of the National Internal Revenue Code, thereby rendering his declarations in his Certificate of Candidacy false material representations warranting its cancellation.

RULING

No. The penalty of perpetual disqualification was not automatically imposed. The concurring opinion emphasizes that election laws must be interpreted liberally in favor of popular sovereignty. The core of the ruling rests on the specific language and application of the law. Section 286 of the NIRC of 1977, which petitioners cited as the source of the automatic perpetual disqualification, took effect on January 1, 1986, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1994. PEMJ’s offenses were committed from 1982 to 1985, and the law in force at the time of the commission of the offenses was Batas Pambansa Blg. 135. The applicable provision under BP 135 did not contain the same mandatory and automatic language for perpetual disqualification as the later Section 286. Furthermore, the judgment of conviction by the Court of Appeals did not impose the penalty of perpetual disqualification. Penal laws, including tax laws with penal sanctions, are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. For a penalty to be imposed, it must be clearly decreed by the court in its judgment. Since the court did not impose it, and the law at the time of the offenses did not prescribe it as an automatic accessory penalty, PEMJ was not perpetually disqualified. Therefore, his declarations in his COC were not false, and the overwhelming choice of the electorate must be respected.