G.R. No. 259467, November 11, 2024
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MAGDALENA K. LUPOYON, CLARK CHATONGNA NGAYA, EDMUNDO CHALLIIS SIDCHAYAO, FERNANDO YACAM-MA CABLOG, ALBERT T. MARAFO, AND DANILO RABINA LUCAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
FACTS
Accused-appellants, former municipal officials of Barlig, Mountain Province, were charged with two counts of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The charges stemmed from a pathway project funded by a donation from GMA Network, Inc. (PHP 144,760.00) and an open gymnasium project funded by a donation from ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (PHP 3 million). The funds were deposited into the local government unit’s (LGU) trust fund. The LGU implemented both projects without conducting a public bidding. The officials justified this by stating they wanted to maximize the use of the donated funds by avoiding contractor profits and taxes and by utilizing local labor, some of whom were willing to work without pay. For the gym project, the LGU transferred the donated funds from the trust account to a different bank account, contending the private donations were beyond the audit jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA). COA issued a Notice of Suspension and later a Notice of Disallowance due to the lack of public bidding and supporting documents. The Sandiganbayan convicted the accused-appellants, ruling that the absence of public bidding caused undue injury to the government by denying it the opportunity to get the most advantageous cost and resulted in unwarranted benefits to suppliers.
ISSUE
Whether the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
RULING
No. The accused-appellants are acquitted. The Concurring Opinion emphasizes that a violation of procurement law does not automatically constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. First, the Informations did not allege the modalities of “manifest partiality” or “giving any private party unwarranted benefits,” and thus, a conviction based on these uncharged acts would violate due process. Second, the prosecution failed to establish “evident bad faith,” as there was no proof the accused acted with fraudulent intent or ill will; their mistaken belief that they could bypass bidding to maximize community benefit, though legally erroneous, did not amount to fraud. Third, the prosecution failed to establish “gross inexcusable negligence,” as their actions, while negligent, did not show a conscious disregard of duty or want of even slight care required for criminal liability. The absence of public bidding alone, without proof of corrupt intent or the specific elements of the crime, is insufficient for a conviction under RA 3019.
