G.R. No. 257446. October 12, 2022.
JHON KENNETH M. PORTO, CHENNIE ANN ROSE ELCA, AND JOMAR JONHEDEL B. BRUTO (REPRESENTED BY MARIFE B. BRUTO), PETITIONERS, VS. GRANT INSTITUTE OF TRADE & TECHNOLOGY, INC., AND/OR ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NAMELY: DR. RUEL REYES, ATTY. JANET JOY A. REYES, LISHA ALYANNA A. REYES, JESSE R. REYES, AND NESTOR R. MIRANDA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioners, students of Grant Institute of Trade & Technology (GITT), filed consolidated complaints for Estafa and Falsification against GITT’s Board of Directors. They alleged that they enrolled in and completed GITT’s Cruise Ship Management Course, only to later discover from the Technical Education & Skills Development Authority (TESDA) that GITT had no authority to offer such a course. The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City found probable cause for Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, ruling that GITT’s false representation of having TESDA accreditation induced petitioners to enroll, causing them damage.
The Office of the Regional Prosecutor (ORP) for Region IV reversed the OCP’s ruling. The ORP found that GITT and its directors acted in good faith, as they had applied for the necessary authority and entrusted the application to a school official who failed to secure it. The ORP also noted the absence of proof of tuition fee payments via official receipts and that petitioners received education and subsequently found employment. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) to challenge the ORP’s resolution.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, thereby upholding the ORP’s finding of no probable cause for Estafa.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s dismissal. The Court held that a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy to assail the ORP’s resolution, which was issued pursuant to its delegated authority under Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 70. The ORP’s resolution was a final disposition of the appeal, not an interlocutory order. The aggrieved party’s sole remedy against such a final resolution is to file a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice, as provided under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal and subsequent DOJ issuances. Since petitioners did not avail of this remedy, their direct resort to the CA via certiorari was procedurally infirm.
On the substantive issue, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the ORP’s finding of no probable cause. Probable cause requires more than mere suspicion but less than evidence justifying conviction. The ORP correctly considered the element of deceit. The evidence showed GITT’s good-faith belief in its authority due to its pending application and the negligence of its employee. Furthermore, the element of damage was not sufficiently established. Petitioners failed to present receipts for tuition payments, relying only on assessment forms, and they admittedly received training and obtained employment. The ORP’s conclusion that the facts and evidence did not engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed was a factual determination within its discretion, which was not tainted with arbitrariness.