GR 25698; (October, 1980) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-25698 October 23, 1980
PERPETUA BUHAIN VDA. DE MINTU, Administrative Estate of the late EUGENIO MINTU, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and CO CHIN LENG, respondents.
FACTS
This case originated from a foreclosure suit where private respondent Co Chin Leng prevailed. After the judgment became final, a foreclosure sale was conducted. Petitioner Perpetua Buhain Vda. de Mintu, as administratrix of the estate of the original defendant Eugenio Mintu, later challenged this sale, alleging a denial of procedural due process. She claimed that she and her co-heirs were totally unaware of the appellate proceedings, believing the case was still pending in the Supreme Court. Her basis was that a copy of a Supreme Court resolution certifying the case to the Court of Appeals was sent by registered mail to her counsel, Atty. Calupitan, at 713 Aurora Boulevard, Quezon City, but was returned “unclaimed.” She argued that her counsel never filed pleadings or appeared after the case was remanded for execution, and crucially, that none of her lawyers received an official copy of the Court of Appeals’ final decision.
Respondents countered that the record undeniably showed numerous notices, during both trial and appellate stages, were consistently sent to petitioner’s counsel of record, Attys. Calupitan and Fojas, at the stated Aurora Boulevard address. Petitioner herself had listed this address in her pleadings and brief. Furthermore, a copy of the motion for execution of judgment was properly sent to her long before the actual sale. The Court of Appeals granted a motion for reconsideration, setting aside its earlier order for a new auction and ruling the case terminated.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner was denied procedural due process in the foreclosure proceedings, thereby rendering the Court of Appeals’ judgment and the subsequent execution sale invalid.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, upholding the Court of Appeals’ resolution. The legal logic is anchored on the established doctrine that notice to counsel of record is notice to the client. The Court found the petitioner’s claim of being “totally unaware” to be an ingenious but unavailing attempt to circumvent the factual record, which clearly demonstrated that all requisite notices were sent to her counsel at the official address of record. The return of one notice as “unclaimed” does not invalidate service when the address provided by the party herself is used. Petitioner’s failure to claim mail or to update the court of any change in her counsel’s address constitutes negligence for which she alone is responsible.
The Court emphasized that procedural due process was satisfied because the law does not require actual receipt by the party when notice is properly sent to counsel of record. To rule otherwise would allow parties to indefinitely delay finality of judgments through their own or their counsel’s neglect. The decision had been rendered over a decade prior, and litigation must reach an end. The allegation of a due process violation was therefore bereft of legal and factual support. The petition was dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
