G.R. No. L-25694 November 29, 1976
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, LUCIO SANTOS, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

Petitioner Lucio Santos filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention under a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration. The warrant was based on the allegation that Santos was a Chinese citizen, Ong Hiong King, who had illegally entered the Philippines. Santos denied being an alien. In his return to the writ, the Commissioner asserted that Santos was a Chinese subject, an illegal entrant, and that deportation proceedings were pending before the Board of Special Inquiry. The Commissioner also argued that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the deportation matter and that Santos failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The lower court, without ruling on the citizenship issue, ordered Santos’s provisional release upon posting a P5,000 bond to ensure his appearance at the deportation hearings. The Commissioner appealed this order to the Supreme Court, contending that the arrest and detention were lawful.

ISSUE

Whether the Commissioner of Immigration has the authority to order the arrest and detention of an alien pending the investigation and hearing of deportation charges, absent a final order of deportation.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order for Santos’s provisional release, applying the doctrine established in Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board. The legal logic is clear: the executive power to deport does not inherently include the power to arrest during the investigatory stage. Under the applicable 1935 Constitution, a warrant of arrest must be based on probable cause determined by a judge. This constitutional safeguard applies uniformly and does not distinguish between criminal and administrative proceedings.
The Court clarified that an arrest warrant is permissible to execute a final order of deportation, as it is issued to carry out a conclusive finding. However, during the preliminary investigation phase—where the very grounds for deportation are still being determined—detaining the individual is not indispensable. In this case, it was admitted that deportation proceedings against Santos were merely pending; no final deportation order existed. Consequently, the Commissioner’s warrant of arrest, issued solely for the purpose of securing Santos’s presence during the investigation, was constitutionally infirm. The provisional release upon bond properly balanced the state’s interest in conducting proceedings with the individual’s right to liberty pending a final determination of his status.