G.R. No. 255258. October 19, 2022
HEIRS OF ARTURO E. BANDOY AND HEIRS OF ANGELITA E. BANDOY, PETITIONERS, VS. ALEXANDER E. BANDOY, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

Spouses Ambrocio and Matilde Bandoy owned Lot No. 3516. Upon Ambrocio’s death, his heirs—children Arturo, Angelita, and Alexander—executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale” in 1992. This document transferred the lot pro indiviso to the three siblings and also sold a 9,329-square-meter portion to Florencio Benitez, leaving a remainder of 5,436 square meters designated as Lot No. 3516-B. Arturo and Angelita later died, and their heirs demanded partition of Lot No. 3516-B from Alexander, who refused, claiming sole ownership.
Alexander asserted that a verbal partition had occurred among the siblings, and only the shares of Arturo and Angelita were sold to Benitez, excluding his own share. To support this, he presented a handwritten note and an affidavit from Angelita, executed years after the 1992 document, stating that Alexander did not sell his share. Alexander also sold several portions of the remaining lot between 1992 and 2012 without objection from his siblings during their lifetimes.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that an oral partition had taken place, thereby vesting sole ownership of the remaining portion of Lot No. 3516-B in Alexander.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Regional Trial Court’s decision ordering partition. The legal logic is anchored on the formal requirements for partition and the conclusive nature of the written 1992 extrajudicial settlement. The 1992 document clearly established a state of co-ownership over Lot No. 3516, including the remainder (Lot No. 3516-B), among Arturo, Angelita, and Alexander. A partition of a co-owned property, being a mode of terminating co-ownership, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The alleged oral partition was not substantiated. Angelita’s subsequent handwritten note and affidavit, being self-serving declarations made long after the execution of the binding 1992 document, cannot prevail over or modify its explicit terms. These belated statements are inadmissible against her co-heirs as they do not fall under any recognized exception to the rule that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the act or declaration of another.
Furthermore, Alexander’s act of selling portions of the property does not conclusively prove an oral partition or his exclusive ownership. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner has the right to freely sell or dispose of their ideal share without the consent of the others, but such act does not affect the ownership of the specific physical portion until a proper partition is effected. His sales merely constituted dispositions of his ideal share in the co-ownership, not acts of absolute ownership over specific, partitioned areas. The absence of protest from his siblings, who were also co-owners, does not equate to ratification of an oral partition. Therefore, the property remained in a state of co-ownership, and the petitioners, as successors-in-interest, correctly sought its judicial partition.