G.R. No. 253480 , April 25, 2023
TEODORO B. BUNAYOG, PETITIONER, VS. FOSCON SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC., /GREEN MARITIME CO., LTD., /EVELYN M. DEFENSOR, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioner Teodoro B. Bunayog was engaged as a chief cook by respondent Foscon Shipmanagement, Inc. for its foreign principal, Green Maritime Co., Ltd. On July 31, 2016, while onboard the vessel, petitioner experienced cough, fever, and difficulty in breathing. He was diagnosed in Japan with left lung pneumonia, declared unfit for sea duty, and repatriated on August 4, 2016. He was referred to a company-designated physician, who diagnosed him with “pneumonia with recurrent pleural effusion, left s/p thoracentesis, left.” After treatment, the company-designated physician declared him fit to work on September 28, 2016. Petitioner then consulted his own physician, who declared him unfit for sea duty. On November 10, 2016, petitioner sent a letter to the respondent’s president, informing her of his doctor’s findings and his willingness to undergo further medical examination. Respondents did not respond. Petitioner filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits.

ISSUE

The central legal issue, as discussed in the Separate Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Gesmundo, pertains to the exception to the general rule on the binding nature of a physician’s findings when the parties fail to secure a third doctor. Specifically, whether the findings of either the seafarer’s or the company-designated physician (depending on who caused the failure to secure a third doctor) can be reviewed by tribunals and courts if such findings are tainted with bias, unsupported by medical records, or lack scientific basis.

RULING

The Separate Concurring Opinion concurs with the ponencia’s dismissal of the petition and its establishment of guidelines for third-doctor referral. It emphasizes that the exception allowing judicial review of a physician’s otherwise binding findings is rooted in the burden of proof in compensation claims. The seafarer bears the burden to prove his disability claim by substantial evidence. The opinion clarifies that the referral to a third doctor under Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC is a procedural mechanism for the seafarer to contradict the company doctor’s assessment. However, the labor tribunals and courts are not strictly bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence and must ascertain the facts objectively. Therefore, when the mandated conclusive finding (of either physician) is found to be biased, lacking in scientific basis, or unsupported by medical records, the tribunals and courts are justified in examining the inherent merits of the medical findings and the totality of evidence to determine the rightful disability claim. Applying this to the case, the opinion agrees with the ponencia that the findings of the company-designated physician were more credible, as they were based on extensive treatment and multiple tests, whereas the seafarer’s doctor’s findings were vague and inconclusive. Thus, petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proof.