G.R. No. 252739, April 16, 2024
XXX, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

The petitioner, XXX, was charged with a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004). The Information alleged that he “willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kept a mistress,” thereby causing mental and emotional anguish upon his wife, AAA. The case reached the Supreme Court en banc, which affirmed the conviction. This text is from the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Inting, who agreed with the affirmance but elaborated on specific legal points.

ISSUE

The primary legal issues addressed in the concurring opinion are: 1) Whether the charge of “keeping a mistress” is broad enough to include a conviction for causing mental anguish through “marital infidelity” under the variance doctrine; and 2) Whether specific intent (mens rea) is a necessary element for a violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 when the alleged means is marital infidelity.

RULING

Justice Inting concurred in affirming the conviction. The ruling of the concurring opinion is as follows:
1. On the Variance Doctrine and Marital Infidelity: The charge of “keeping a mistress” in the Information is broad enough to include the act of “marital infidelity.” The opinion defines “marital infidelity” as a single act of sexual intercourse between a married person and someone who is not their legal spouse. It holds that the Information sufficiently stated the elements of the offense and allowed the accused to prepare his defense. Therefore, pursuant to the variance doctrine under Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner could be validly convicted of violating Section 5(i) based on proof of marital infidelity that caused mental anguish, even if the Information specified “keeping a mistress.”
2. On the Element of Intent: Specific intent is not a necessary element for a violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 when the means used to cause emotional or mental anguish is marital infidelity. The opinion distinguishes this case from prior rulings (like Acharon v. People) which required intent when the means was denial of financial support. The determination is based on the language and legislative intent of the statute. The law does not use words like “knowingly,” “willfully,” or “for the purpose of” in defining the act of causing mental anguish through marital infidelity. Consequently, for this specific means, the offense is treated as malum prohibitum, where the prohibited act itself is punishable regardless of the perpetrator’s specific intent to cause the anguish. The legislative power to define crimes allows Congress to omit intent as an element.