G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021
ATTY. HOWARD M. CALLEJA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. (Consolidated with G.R. Nos. 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, and 252733)

FACTS

Multiple petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 11479, otherwise known as “The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020.” The petitioners, comprising individuals, lawmakers, party-list organizations, labor groups, and civil society organizations, assailed the law on various constitutional grounds. They argued that the statute contains overbroad and vague definitions of “terrorism” and related acts, infringes upon fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and association, violates due process, and grants excessive powers to the Anti-Terrorism Council. The respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, defended the law as a necessary and constitutional measure to combat terrorism, asserting that its provisions are within the legislature’s police power and include sufficient safeguards.

ISSUE

The principal issue is whether Republic Act No. 11479, “The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020,” is unconstitutional.

RULING

The Supreme Court, in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, declared the law constitutional except for two specific provisions which it struck down as unconstitutional.
1. The qualifier portion of Section 4 of the law is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court held that the definition of “terrorism” is not overbroad or vague. It requires the confluence of several elements: the commission of specific predicate crimes; intent to create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and the purpose of coercing the government to give in to an unlawful demand. The Court found this definition sufficiently precise and narrow.
2. Section 25 of the law is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The provision on designations by the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) was upheld. The Court ruled that an ATC designation is merely preliminary and administrative, intended to trigger the freeze order by the Court of Appeals under the Anti-Money Laundering Act. It is not equivalent to a judicial proscription under Section 26 of the same law and does not constitute a judgment of criminal guilt.
3. The second method of arrest under Section 29 of the law is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The provision allowing warrantless arrest and detention for up to 24 days (14 days extendable by 10 more days) was upheld. The Court ruled that the period is not a penalty but part of a “reasonable period” of investigation under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. It found the extended period justified by the complex nature of terrorism investigations, provided judicial intervention is available.
4. Section 9 of the law is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The provision penalizing “inciting to commit terrorism” by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners, or other representations was declared void for being overbroad and violating freedom of expression. The Court distinguished it from the constitutional crime of inciting to sedition, as it lacks the essential element of a direct incitement to commit specific, imminent lawless action.
5. The phrase “which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public safety” in the proviso of Section 12 (on planning, training, preparing, and facilitating the commission of terrorism) is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court declared this phrase void for being overbroad, as it could criminalize protected and innocuous speech and conduct.
The petitions were PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 11479 is upheld, with the exception of Section 9 and the aforementioned phrase in the proviso of Section 12, which are declared unconstitutional.