G.R. No. L-24964. September 28, 1976
Higinio Dizon, petitioner-appellant, vs. Sheriff of Manila, Hon. Ambrosio Geraldez, Judge, City Court of Manila and the Corporacion Franciscana, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Higinio Dizon filed a petition for relief from judgment in the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking to set aside a default judgment rendered against him by the Manila City Court in an ejectment suit filed by Corporacion Franciscana. The city court had ordered Dizon to vacate the premises at 2536-A Lamayan Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, and to pay back rentals. Dizon’s petition, however, contained a defective verification.
Corporacion Franciscana moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it was filed beyond the reglementary periods prescribed under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. This rule requires that a petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and not more than six (6) months after such judgment was entered. The lower court dismissed Dizon’s petition, finding it was filed after the expiration of the sixty-day period. Dizon appealed, contending his petition was timely and invoking inapplicable precedents.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed Dizon’s petition for relief from judgment for being filed out of time.

RULING

Yes, the dismissal was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order, holding that Dizon’s petition was indisputably filed beyond the mandatory periods under Rule 38. The Court clarified that Section 3 establishes two concurrent limitations: the petition must be filed within sixty days from the petitioner’s knowledge of the judgment, but in no case beyond six months from its entry. These periods are jurisdictional, non-extendible, and cannot be suspended.
Dizon’s argument, invoking an alleged ruling in Follosco vs. Director of Lands that a petition could be filed even after six months, was baseless; the Court noted counsel evidently had not read the case, as it actually supports the strict application of the twin periods. His additional invocation of Abellana vs. Dosdos, regarding new facts affecting rights, was irrelevant to the core issue of timeliness. The new allegation about rental increases, raised only on appeal, did not alter the jurisdictional defect of late filing.
The Court meticulously reviewed the records and found no injustice in the dismissal. It noted, without ruling upon, a potential error in the ejectment complaint regarding ownership of the house, but emphasized this was not pertinent to the procedural flaw barring relief. Consequently, the appeal was devoid of merit. The order of dismissal was affirmed with costs against petitioner-appellant Dizon.