G.R. No. 2485 : August 17, 1905
PARTIES:
Plaintiff-Appellee: Antonio de la Cruz
Defendant-Appellant: Santiago Garcia
Counsel: Vicente Foz for appellant; Leocadio Joaquin for appellee
FACTS:
On July 21, 1903, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Antonio de la Cruz. The defendant, Santiago Garcia, received notice of this judgment on July 31, 1903. On the same day he received notice, Garcia filed a motion for a new trial, arguing the decision was against the weight of evidence. The court denied this motion on October 26, 1903. On October 29, 1903, Garcia excepted to both the order denying his motion and to the final judgment. Subsequently, on November 16, 1903, he presented a bill of exceptions, which was allowed by the court on February 6, 1905, over the plaintiff’s objection.
The plaintiff-appellee moved to dismiss the bill of exceptions, contending that the defendant failed to except to the judgment at its rendition, upon notice, or as soon as possible thereafter. Instead, the defendant only excepted nearly three months after notice of judgment, following the denial of his motion for a new trial.
ISSUE:
Whether a motion for a new trial, filed promptly after notice of judgment, can be considered the equivalent of an exception to that judgment for the purpose of perfecting an appeal via a bill of exceptions.
RULING:
NO, the motion for a new trial is not a statutory equivalent to an exception, but under established jurisprudence, a promptly filed motion suspends the period for taking an exception. The Court, through Justice Mapa, denied the motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions.
The Court clarified that the statutory method for perfecting an appeal is by taking an exception to the judgment and filing a bill of exceptions under Section 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, it reiterated its doctrine from prior cases (Sparrevohn vs. Fisher, Vicente Gomez vs. Jacinta Hipolito, Eulogio Garcia vs. Ambler and Sweeney) that a motion for a new trial, if filed immediately after notice of judgment or within a reasonable time thereafter, is treated as the functional equivalent of an exception. This motion serves as a formal protest against the judgment and has the legal effect of suspending the period within which the appellant must notify the court of the intention to present a bill of exceptions. The ten-day period to file the bill of exceptions then begins to run from notice of the order denying the new trial.
Applying this doctrine, the Court found that the defendant was not negligent. He filed his motion for a new trial on the very day he received notice of the adverse judgment. After his motion was denied, he promptly excepted and later filed his bill of exceptions. Therefore, his appeal was perfected in due time.
DISSENTING OPINIONS:
Justice Johnson dissented, arguing that the right to appeal is purely statutory and the Court has no authority to amend the clear procedure in Section 143. He contended that a motion for a new trial (governed by Section 145) and an exception for appeal (governed by Section 143) are separate and distinct remedies. He maintained that an exception must be taken “immediately” or “as soon as possible” after judgment, and the nearly three-month delay in this case was fatal to the appeal.
* Justice Torres also dissented, associating himself with the reasoning of Justice Johnson.