G.R. No. L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977
FAUSTINA CALLANTA, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIPE VILLANUEVA, City Judge, City Court of Dagupan City, CORNELIA JIMENEZ and PASTORA DAVID JIMENEZ, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Faustina Callanta was charged with two counts of grave oral defamation before the City Court of Dagupan City. The respondent City Judge, Felipe Villanueva, issued warrants for her arrest after conducting a preliminary examination. Callanta filed motions to quash the complaints, contending that the City Fiscal, not the City Judge, had the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation, thereby rendering the warrants void for lack of jurisdiction. The motions were denied.
After the issuance of the warrants, Callanta posted the required bail bonds and obtained her provisional liberty. The records further showed that the City Fiscal had actively participated in the proceedings. The cases were referred to his office, he appeared at hearings manifesting readiness for trial, and he did not seek a reinvestigation, indicating his agreement with the complaints filed.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent City Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrants of arrest after conducting the preliminary examination himself, and whether the petition for certiorari is the proper remedy.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions. The legal logic is twofold. First, by posting bail and securing her provisional liberty, Callanta waived any irregularity in her arrest or any defect in the preliminary examination preceding the warrant’s issuance. The Court consistently holds that posting a bail bond constitutes a waiver of objections to procedural defects in the arrest process, as established in cases like Zacarias v. Cruz and Luna v. Plaza. This principle prevents a party from contesting the validity of an arrest after voluntarily submitting to the court’s jurisdiction by seeking bail.
Second, the petitioner’s foundational argument—that only the City Fiscal could conduct the preliminary investigation—is legally erroneous. Her reliance on Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila is misplaced, as that case interpreted the specific charter of Manila. In contrast, the Charter of Dagupan City, under Republic Act No. 170, explicitly grants the City Court the authority “to conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishment.” Therefore, the respondent Judge acted within his statutory jurisdiction. The City Fiscal’s subsequent active prosecution further negated any claim of jurisdictional infirmity. The petition for certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, cannot prosper where no grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction is evident.