G.R. No. 244413, February 18, 2020
NURULLAJE SAYRE Y MALAMPAD @ “INOL”, PETITIONER, VS. HON. DAX GONZAGA XENOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PANABO CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH 34; HON. MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 27, which provides amended guidelines on plea bargaining for violations of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). The Supreme Court, in a prior case (Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo), had established that plea bargaining is a rule of procedure within the Court’s exclusive domain. Subsequently, the Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, issued OCA Circular No. 90-2018, which provides a specific plea bargaining framework for drugs cases. This framework includes, for example, that an accused charged with illegal sale of 0.01 to 0.99 gram of shabu (Section 5 of RA 9165) may be allowed to plead guilty to illegal possession of drug paraphernalia (Section 12 of RA 9165). The dissenting opinion argues that DOJ Circular No. 27 encroaches upon this judicial rule-making power.

ISSUE

Whether DOJ Circular No. 27 is unconstitutional for encroaching upon the Supreme Court’s exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure, specifically regarding plea bargaining in drugs cases.

RULING

The dissenting opinion of Justice Caguioa concludes that DOJ Circular No. 27 is unconstitutional. The ruling is based on the following points:
1. The Supreme Court’s power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure, including plea bargaining, is exclusive. This power is a safeguard of the Judiciary’s institutional independence. Any executive issuance that repeals, alters, or modifies procedural rules promulgated by the Court constitutes a trespass upon this prerogative.
2. OCA Circular No. 90-2018, issued by the Court, is not merely advisory or a “floor” for acceptable plea bargains. It is a proscriptive framework that specifies the exact plea bargain crimes and corresponding penalties that lower courts are to approve. Its level of specificity, based on judicial wisdom and observation (such as noting the prevalence of acquittals for miniscule drug quantities due to procedural lapses), belies any characterization as a mere minimum guideline.
3. The two circulars (OCA Circular No. 90-2018 and DOJ Circular No. 27) are irreconcilable. The concept of a judicial framework is antithetical to allowing the DOJ full discretion to deviate from it. Attempting to harmonize them amounts to a surrender of the Court’s powers.
4. While the DOJ plays an indispensable role in plea bargaining through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion (e.g., deciding on a case-to-case basis whether to agree to a plea bargain), its role ends where the Court’s rule-making power begins. Once a prosecutor opens a case to plea bargaining, the determination of the legally acceptable “lesser offense” the accused may plead guilty to falls within the exclusive ambit of the Court.
5. The Court, as an impartial tribunal, is in the best position to disinterestedly evaluate plea bargain scenarios and find the middle ground between the State’s right to prosecute and the accused’s rights. The DOJ, as the prosecutorial arm mandated to prosecute to the full extent of the law, cannot be expected to objectively assess this middle ground regarding penalties.
6. The characterization of DOJ Circular No. 27 as an “internal guideline” binding only on prosecutors does not negate its unconstitutionality. Its “internal” character ends when it directly affects matters outside the DOJ, such as the plea bargaining process in courts. A prosecutor withholding consent based on an overstepping internal instruction can forestall negotiations and create deadlocks contrary to law.
Based on these premises, the dissenting opinion votes to GRANT the petition.