G.R. No. 244128, September 8, 2020
MARIO M. MADERA, BEVERLY C. MANANGUITE, CARISSA D. GALING, AND JOSEFINA O. PELO, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) AND COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VIII, RESPONDENTS.

CONCURRING OPINION, INTING, J.

FACTS

This is a Concurring Opinion by Justice Inting in a main case involving a disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). The opinion does not detail the specific transaction in the principal petition but uses the case as a platform to expound on the jurisprudence surrounding the liability of officials and recipients in disallowance cases. Justice Inting traces the legal lineage from the seminal case of Blaquera v. Hon. Alcala, which first introduced the good faith exception to refunding disallowed amounts. He notes that Blaquera was unique as it was primarily a constitutional challenge to administrative orders, not a direct appeal of a COA disallowance, and involved numerous recipients and small sums.
The opinion observes that subsequent jurisprudence has applied Blaquera’s good faith principle in varied factual contexts involving illegal disbursements of bonuses, allowances, and benefits. Justice Inting provides a comparative table analyzing several key cases, highlighting the different roles of recipients, approving officers, and certifying officers, and how their liability was adjudicated based on the specific grounds for disallowance and their demonstrated good or bad faith.

ISSUE

The core issue addressed in the concurring opinion is whether the concept of “good faith” in disallowance cases should be applied uniformly or on a strict case-to-case basis, considering the distinct factual circumstances and roles of the individuals involved in each disallowed transaction.

RULING

Justice Inting concurs with the ponencia and emphasizes that disallowance cases must be resolved on a strict case-to-case basis. He argues that each disallowance is unique in its facts, the nature of the amounts involved, and the individuals charged. The legal logic is that blanket rules are inappropriate because the determination of good faith—and consequently, liability for refund—depends on a nuanced evaluation of the specific circumstances surrounding each transaction and the specific role each actor played.
The opinion clarifies that while Blaquera established the good faith principle, its application has been refined. Passive recipients who received disallowed amounts in good faith, believing they were entitled to them, are often exempted from liability. However, approving and certifying officers who actively participated in the illegal disbursement are generally held liable unless they too can prove good faith, such as an honest belief that the disbursement was lawful, and there was no patent disregard of existing rules. Justice Inting concludes that the Court must remain discriminating in exonerating payees, evaluating the attending facts of each case individually to justly assign liability among recipients, officers, and certifiers/approvers based on their respective participation and state of mind.