G.R. No. L-24199. November 29, 1971.
JESUS WYLENGCO, petitioner-appellant, vs. EPIFANIA GUEZON VDA. DE CABIGTING, ERLINDA CRISTOBAL VIRAY, Special Counsel of Angeles City and ELLER DULA TORRES, City Fiscal of Angeles City, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioner Jesus Wylengco appealed the dismissal of his petition for certiorari and prohibition by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The petition sought to restrain the City Fiscal’s Office of Angeles City from proceeding with a preliminary investigation for serious oral defamation filed by respondent Epifania Guezon Vda. de Cabigting. The incident stemmed from a dispute where Wylengco’s fallen bamboo trees damaged Cabigting’s fence. After Cabigting cut the bamboos but left the trunks, an angry Wylengco publicly uttered defamatory words against her on July 22, 1964. A criminal complaint was filed two days later.
During the preliminary investigation, Cabigting and her witness testified that Wylengco was very angry when he made the statements. Wylengco subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the admitted anger indicated the offense was only slight oral defamation, which prescribes in two months. Since no information was filed within two months from July 22, 1964, he claimed the crime had prescribed. The investigating Special Counsel, Erlinda Cristobal Viray, denied the motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration, directing Wylengco to present his evidence to allow a fuller appreciation of the facts.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Special Counsel Erlinda C. Viray acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in denying Wylengco’s motion to dismiss and directing the preliminary investigation to proceed.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the Special Counsel did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the nature and purpose of a preliminary investigation and the scope of judicial review via certiorari. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty. The investigating fiscal has the discretion to assess the evidence presented. In denying the motion to dismiss, the Special Counsel essentially ruled that the evidence at that stage did not indubitably justify dismissal, particularly on the complex question of whether the defamation was serious or slight—a determination that hinges on factors like the exact words used, the context, and the presence of provocation. Her directive for Wylengco to present his evidence was a prudent step to clarify the facts, not an arbitrary or oppressive act.
The Court emphasized that the petition for certiorari only questioned the propriety of the Special Counsel’s procedural ruling, not the merits of the criminal charge itself. The doctrine cited by Wylengco, that defamation uttered in anger with provocation constitutes slight defamation, was found inapplicable as the record showed no evidence of provocation by Cabigting at the time of the incident. Moreover, the denial of the motion to dismiss did not preclude Wylengco from raising the defense of prescription during the trial proper if an information were filed. The fiscal’s action was within her legitimate discretion, and absent a clear showing of caprice or jurisdictional error, certiorari does not lie. The appeal was deemed dilatory, and treble costs were assessed against appellant Wylengco.