G.R. No. 241036, January 26, 2021
Lucila David and the Heirs of Rene F. Aguas, namely: Princess Luren D. Aguas, Danica Lane D. Aguas, Sean Patrick D. Aguas, Sean Michael D. Aguas and Samantha D. Aguas, Petitioners, vs. Cherry S. Calilung, Respondent.

FACTS

This is a Separate Opinion by Justice Lazaro-Javier. The main case involves petitioners Lucila David (the former spouse of the deceased Rene Aguas, whose marriage was declared void ab initio in 2005) and the heirs of Rene Aguas, against respondent Cherry S. Calilung (who subsequently married Rene). The proceedings concern the settlement of Rene Aguas’s estate. The ponencia (main decision by Justice Delos Santos) held that Lucila David is a stranger to the estate with no standing to participate, as she is not an heir due to the nullity of her marriage. It also stated that the Aguas heirs could collaterally attack the validity of Rene and Cherry’s marriage in the estate settlement proceedings.

ISSUE

1. Whether the ponencia‘s pronouncement that the Aguas heirs can collaterally attack the validity of Rene and Cherry’s marriage in the estate proceedings constitutes binding ratio decidendi or is merely an obiter dictum/legal advice.
2. Whether there are legal nuances and cautions regarding the basis for attacking the marriage (Article 53 of the Family Code) and the procedural options available to the parties in the estate proceedings.
3. Whether the general rule that a probate court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed by outside parties admits of exceptions, such as when parties waive the procedural limitation.

RULING

1. The pronouncement in the ponencia that “Aguas heirs can collaterally attack the validity of Rene and Cherry’s marriage in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rene” is not ratio decidendi but is a legal advice and an obiter dictum. While procedurally allowed, such a challenge does not guarantee success. The Court offers this guidance, but parties are cautioned that what is procedurally permissible may not substantively prevail.
2. Legal Nuances and Cautions:
* The petitioners’ basis for claiming nullity is Article 53 of the Family Code. This provision must be correlated with Articles 43, 44, and 50 of the Family Code and the ruling in Diño v. Diño (655 Phil. 1755 [2011]).
* For further enlightenment on the petitioners’ procedural options at the trial court, reference is made to Rodriguez v. Rodriguez (824 Phil. 1061 [2018]).
3. Exception to the General Rule on Probate Court Jurisdiction:
The ponencia* correctly stated the general rule that Lucila, as a stranger to the estate, cannot have her property claims adjudicated in the Settlement Proceeding, as a probate court cannot determine title to properties claimed by outside parties.
* However, an exception exists. The determination of whether a matter should be resolved by a court in its general or limited (probate) jurisdiction is a procedural, not jurisdictional, question that may be waived.
* A probate court may settle questions of ownership if the claimant and all other parties with legal interest consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the issue to the probate court. This consent can be shown by seeking affirmative relief from that court.
* In this case, since Lucila and her co-petitioners appear to have no adverse interests for now, there is no legal obstacle for them to submit the settlement of Lucila’s proprietary interests to the intestate court, provided all parties, including respondent Cherry, consent. This would promote judicial economy, avoid multiplicity of suits, and save the estate from depletion due to legal expenses.
* The endorsement of compromise and alternative dispute resolution is also encouraged for the sake of clarity and the repose of the deceased.