G.R. No. L-23978 December 27, 1969
PHILANDER LONGAO, petitioner, vs. HON. JEROME FAKAT, Municipal Judge of Bontoc, Mountain Province, respondent

FACTS

Petitioner Philander Longao was the accused in Criminal Case No. 301 of the Municipal Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province. On April 18, 1960, he pleaded guilty to an amended complaint charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence, punishable under Article 365, paragraph 7, enumeration No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, committed by operating his car “in flagrant violation of the Automobile Law” and driving on the wrong lane, resulting in the death of Andrew Ngelangel. After granting his request to prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the court rendered a judgment of conviction, sentencing him to an indeterminate imprisonment, indemnifying the heirs of the deceased with P6,000, and awarding P1,000 for moral damages. Petitioner perfected an appeal directly to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-16898), but it was dismissed on March 25, 1961, as the appeal should have been made to the Court of First Instance. A subsequent appeal to the Court of First Instance was also dismissed, with that court holding the appeal should have been made to the Supreme Court. The records were shuttled between courts. The private prosecutor then sought execution of the judgment in the respondent court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and to give due course to his appeal, but these were denied. His attempt to appeal to the Court of First Instance was refused by respondent judge in an order dated June 2, 1964. Petitioner then filed this original action for mandamus and prohibition. In his answer, respondent judge alleged, and petitioner did not deny, that petitioner, a U.S. citizen, had left the Philippines surreptitiously after the decision and had waived his right to appeal by fleeing the jurisdiction.

ISSUE

1. Whether the petitioner was unduly deprived of his right to appeal his conviction.
2. Whether the respondent court erred in basing the penalty on paragraph 2 of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (involving violation of the Automobile Law).
3. Whether the indemnity awarded (P6,000 for death and P1,000 for moral damages) was excessive.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
1. The action had become moot and academic. Citing People vs. Wilson, the Court held that a party who flees the jurisdiction pending appeal is in contempt and is deemed to have waived his appeal. The undenied allegation that petitioner had left the Philippines constituted a waiver of his appeal on the merits.
2. On the merits of the appeal, the Court found no error in basing the penalty on paragraph 2 of Article 365. Petitioner’s plea of guilty was an unqualified admission of the facts alleged in the complaint, which explicitly stated the crime was committed “in flagrant violation of the Automobile Law.” A plea of guilty admits all factual allegations and can be the basis for judgment without further evidence.
3. The indemnity awarded was not excessive. Citing People vs. Pantoja, the Court noted that from the effectivity of the New Civil Code, P6,000 as compensatory damages for death was proper. The incident occurred in 1960, more than ten years after People vs. Amansec established P6,000 as the indemnity for death. The additional P1,000 for moral damages was also not excessive.
The Court also noted a fatal procedural defect: the People of the Philippines was not joined as an indispensable party in this proceeding involving a criminal case. The petition, being one for equitable relief, was denied as petitioner failed to establish premises for such relief, and substantial justice was served by giving due course to the conviction which appeared meritorious. Costs were imposed on petitioner.