G.R. No. 239215, July 12, 2022
RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON, ACTING ON BEHALF OF MINOR RHUBY SIBAL KNUTSON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ELISA R. SARMIENTO-FLORES, IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 69, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TAGUIG CITY, AND ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioner Randy Michael Knutson, acting on behalf of his minor daughter Rhuby, filed a petition for a protection order and custody under Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. The petition alleged that the child’s mother, respondent Rosalina Sibal Knutson, had committed acts of violence and abuse against Rhuby. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the petition, ruling that RA 9262 does not apply when the alleged offender is the child’s own mother. The RTC reasoned that the law specifically defines the offender as a male person (e.g., husband, former husband, or dating partner) committing violence against a woman or her child. Consequently, a mother cannot be considered an offender under this statute.

ISSUE

The core legal issue is whether the remedies under RA 9262, including protection orders and custody awards, are available when the alleged perpetrator of violence against a child is the child’s own mother.

RULING

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Caguioa voted to remand the case but agreed with the RTC’s interpretation that RA 9262 is inapplicable. The ruling is grounded in statutory construction. Where the law’s language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied literally. The title and provisions of RA 9262 consistently protect “women and their children.” The law’s framework is designed to address violence committed by a man against a woman with whom he has or had a relationship, and extends protection to her children as derivative victims. The child is not treated as an independent victim under this law but is protected in connection with the violence committed against the woman. The definition of offenders under Section 3 explicitly enumerates male categories (husband, former husband, etc.), and a mother is not included. Furthermore, the custody provision in Section 28 specifically entitles the “woman victim of violence” to custody of her child, which petitioner, as the father, cannot invoke. Therefore, the law’s letter and spirit do not encompass a scenario where a mother abuses her own child. For such situations, the proper recourse is through other laws and rules specifically designed for child protection, such as the rules on the writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC) or provisions under the Child Abuse Law. The dissent concludes that while the child deserves protection, it must be afforded through the correct legal channels, not by misapplying RA 9262 beyond its intended scope.