G.R. No. 239168, September 15, 2020
ALFREDO J. NON, GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP-TARUC, JOSEFINA PATRICIA A. MAGPALE-ASIRIT AND GERONIMO D. STA. ANA, PETITIONERS, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND ALYANSA PARA SA BAGONG PILIPINAS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioners, who were Commissioners of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), were charged before the Office of the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The charge stemmed from their issuance of ERC Resolution No. 1, which deferred the effectivity of new power supply agreements (PSAs) for a period of six months. Respondent Alyansa para sa Bagong Pilipinas, Inc. alleged this deferral caused undue injury to the government and the public by delaying competitive bidding and giving unwarranted benefits to existing power suppliers. The Ombudsman found probable cause and filed an Information before the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to charge petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

RULING

Yes, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the Ombudsman’s resolutions, and directed the dismissal of the Information. The legal logic is anchored on the absence of essential elements of the crime. For a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the act must be done through “manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence” and must cause “undue injury” or give “unwarranted benefits.” The Court, in its ponencia and as emphasized in the Concurring Opinion of Justice Caguioa, found these elements completely lacking.
The issuance of the questioned resolution was a legitimate exercise of the ERC’s regulatory power under the EPIRA to formulate new competitive bidding rules. There was no evidence of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross negligence. The deferral was a policy decision to study and craft a new framework, not an act of corruption. Furthermore, the alleged “injury” or “benefit” was speculative, as the resolution was a temporary procedural measure. The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause despite this clear absence of essential elements constituted a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, amounting to grave abuse of discretion. The Court intervened to protect the petitioners from baseless prosecution, upholding the principle that preliminary investigation must secure the innocent against hasty and oppressive suits.