G.R. No. L-23714, June 30, 1970
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ALAK (NAFLU), petitioner, vs. HAMILTON DISTILLERY COMPANY and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

FACTS

1. The Supreme Court, in G.R. No. L-18112 (October 30, 1962), reversed a lower court decision and ordered respondent Hamilton Distillery Company to cease unfair labor practices, pay discriminated union members wage differences, and reinstate dismissed employees with back wages.
2. Upon remand for execution, a Court Examiner computed back wages totaling P328,802.00. However, before the court could act, the union (through its then-officers and counsel) and the company entered into a “Partial Amicable Settlement” on December 24, 1963. This agreement moved for dismissal of all backpay and discrimination claims, provided for reinstatement of members who wished to return, promised continuous work, and stipulated that court fees would be borne by the company.
3. The trial judge approved this settlement on December 28, 1963, declaring the case (No. ULP-1454) “closed and terminated.”
4. On January 26, 1964, twenty-one individual union members (of the original forty-nine complainants) filed a motion to reopen the case for implementation of the Supreme Court decision, alleging the compromise was without their knowledge and consent, and seeking to receive back wages per the Examiner’s computation.
5. The union itself, through new counsel (after a change of officers in May 1964), later filed a separate motion to reopen. Both motions were denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc, primarily on the ground that the approved compromise agreement terminated the case, rendering it no longer reopenable under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act 103.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Industrial Relations erred in denying the motions to reopen the case based on Section 17 of Commonwealth Act 103, in light of the approved compromise agreement that terminated the proceedings.

RULING

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the resolutions of the Court of Industrial Relations denying the motions to reopen.
1. Finality of the Compromise Agreement: The compromise agreement was voluntarily entered into by the duly authorized representatives of the union and the company. Its approval by the trial judge made it a final judgment that terminated the case. The union members are bound by the acts of their authorized officers and counsel, and the agreement effectively waived all claims for back wages and discrimination benefits.
2. Application of Section 17, Commonwealth Act 103: This provision allows the reopening of a case during the effectiveness of an award, order, or decision. However, once a case is terminated by a final judgment—such as the approved compromise agreement—it is no longer subject to reopening under Section 17. The Court emphasized that the compromise agreement was a complete settlement, not merely a partial one, and its approval ended the controversy.
3. Alleged Lack of Consent: The claim that the compromise was without the knowledge of some members was insufficient to invalidate it, as the union officers and counsel had apparent authority to represent the members. The subsequent change in union leadership did not affect the finality of the agreement.
4. Procedural Matters: The Court addressed procedural issues, noting the liberality allowed in industrial disputes under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act 103. It held that a motion for new trial or reconsideration of an en banc order suspends the period for appeal if filed within the prescribed time.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Industrial Relations correctly denied the motions to reopen, as the case had been validly terminated by the compromise agreement.