G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018
Lagman, et al. v. Medialdea, et al. (Dissent of Chief Justice Sereno)

FACTS

This case involves consolidated petitions challenging the constitutionality of the congressional extension of Proclamation No. 216, which declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. The President sought, and Congress approved via Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, a further extension from January 1 to December 31, 2018. Petitioners argued the extension lacked sufficient factual basis, contending that the “public safety” requirement necessitates a threat so severe that the government can no longer function normally—a theory referred to as the “Cullamat proposal.”
The Majority, through the ponencia, upheld the extension. It deferred to the factual findings of the Executive and Congress, concluding that the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao and the consequent endangerment of public safety provided a sufficient constitutional basis. The Majority explicitly rejected the Cullamat proposal, reasoning that adopting such a rigid standard would improperly add text to the Constitution and fail to account for the evolving, unconventional nature of threats to public safety.

ISSUE

Did the Majority err in its standard of judicial review by deferring to the factual determinations of the political departments and refusing to establish a substantive constitutional test, such as the “necessity” standard proposed by petitioners, to evaluate the validity of extending martial law?

RULING

Yes, according to the Dissenting Opinion. The ponencia’s approach constitutes an abdication of the Court’s duty of meaningful judicial review. The dissent criticizes the Majority for establishing “invisible” limits on congressional extension power, reducing judicial review to a mere formality. By deferring almost entirely to the Executive’s and Congress’s assertions that rebellion persists and public safety is endangered, the Court failed to independently scrutinize the sufficiency of the factual basis as mandated by the Constitution.
The dissent argues that the Court must engage in a substantive review of “necessity”—whether the situation truly requires the extraordinary measure of martial law—and not merely confirm the existence of rebellion. The Majority’s refusal to adopt the Cullamat proposal or any analogous substantive standard, based on fears of “judicial improvisation” or future adaptability, is deemed unpersuasive. This refusal, the dissent contends, leaves the constitutional safeguards against martial law extensions without operational content, cedes excessive discretion to the political branches, and renders the Court vulnerable to political forces by making its review power inert. The dissent emphasizes that the Constitution requires the Court to allocate boundaries, not merely to ratify the declarations of the Executive and Congress.