GR 23551; (November, 1925) (CRITIQUE)
__________________________________________________________________
THE AI-ASSISTED CRITIQUE
The petitioner’s reliance on the ministerial duty of the Collector under Section 497 of the Administrative Code is legally sound, as the statute clearly directs quarterly allotments to the City. The Insular Auditor’s instruction to divert these funds to the Metropolitan Water District constitutes an unauthorized adjudication of a disputed claim, effectively bypassing judicial process. This overreach violates the principle of ultra vires, as the Auditor lacks statutory authority to settle accounts between distinct public corporations or to unilaterally execute a set-off against the City’s vested revenue share. The City’s argument that its share constitutes property, not a mere debt owed by the Insular Government, strengthens its position that diversion without due process is impermissible.

The core dispute regarding the Water District’s authority to charge the City for water services reveals a flawed statutory interpretation by the Auditor. The petitioner correctly asserts that Act No. 2832 , which created the District, does not expressly empower it to charge the City—the original system owner—for water. The Auditor’s assumption of such a power, and his subsequent enforcement through fund diversion, improperly resolves a substantive legal controversy that should be determined by the courts. This action conflates the Auditor’s administrative settlement function with a judicial power to interpret and enforce liabilities, undermining the separation of powers. The City’s contention that the District merely assumed the system’s assets and liabilities, which included an obligation to furnish water free to the City, presents a colorable claim that necessitates judicial, not administrative, resolution.

The petition for mandamus is compelling because it challenges an executive branch attempt to coercively collect a contested debt through self-help, circumventing the City’s right to contest the obligation in court. The Auditor’s directive transforms the Collector’s clear ministerial duty into a discretionary act conditioned on the Auditor’s disputed interpretation, which is legally untenable. This case underscores the rule of law principle that public funds allocated by statute cannot be diverted to satisfy unliquidated claims without proper legal authority. The City’s position is fortified by the absence of any law authorizing the Auditor to adjudicate inter-corporate disputes or to attach the City’s statutory revenue share, making the continued diversion a clear abuse of discretion warranting judicial intervention.