G.R. No. L-23352 June 30, 1971
SUGA SOTTO YUVIENCO, petitioner, vs. HON. MATEO CANONOY, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, MARCELO SOTTO and PASCUALA SOTTO PAHANG, respondents.

FACTS

In Special Proceeding No. 2232-R, the guardianship proceeding for the incompetent Don Filemon Sotto, the respondent Judge initially appointed petitioner Dra. Suga Sotto Yuvienco as guardian of the ward’s person, with the appointment expressly made subject to the court’s discretion and set to last only until December 31, 1963. This limitation was due to pending compulsory acknowledgment cases filed by respondents Marcelo Sotto and Pascuala Sotto Pahang, among others, who claimed to be the ward’s illegitimate children. Petitioner accepted this appointment, took her oath, and performed her duties under these terms.
Subsequently, Marcelo, Pascuala, and another claimant were declared the ward’s illegitimate children in separate civil cases. Relying on this new status, they moved for their own appointment as guardians to replace the petitioner and others. The respondent Judge, on January 3, 1964, issued an order terminating petitioner’s services effective July 1, 1964, and appointing the respondents in her stead. Although the court later extended petitioner’s term to September 30, 1964 to allow her to settle accounts, the order for her eventual removal stood. Petitioner attempted to appeal these orders, but the respondent Judge dismissed her record on appeal. She then filed this original action for mandamus to compel the judge to approve and certify her record on appeal.

ISSUE

Whether a writ of mandamus should issue to compel the respondent Judge to approve and certify the petitioner’s record on appeal.

RULING

No, mandamus does not lie. The Supreme Court denied the petition. For a writ of mandamus to issue, the petitioner must establish a clear legal right to the performance of a ministerial duty by the respondent. The Court found no such clear right in this case. The original appointment order of June 24, 1962, which set a limited term for petitioner’s guardianship expiring on December 31, 1963, was not appealed by petitioner and thus became final. By accepting the appointment and acting under its specific conditions, petitioner is estopped from contesting the court’s authority to enforce those terms, including the termination of her service.
Furthermore, the authority of a guardianship court to appoint, discharge, or modify the terms of a guardian’s appointment is discretionary, aimed at the ward’s best interest. The respondent Judge’s orders, including the termination of petitioner’s guardianship following the judicial declaration that the respondents were the ward’s illegitimate children and thus his nearest kin, were exercises of this sound discretion. The subsequent orders merely extended her term for administrative winding-up and did not constitute new adjudications granting her a substantive right to remain as guardian. Since the challenged orders were interlocutory and discretionary, and petitioner failed to show a clear legal right to a continued guardianship or to an appeal, mandamus cannot be used to compel the approval of her record on appeal. The preliminary injunction was lifted.