G.R. No. 233155-63, June 23, 2020
JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

The case originated from the issuance of several Cease and Desist Orders (CDOs) by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) of Occidental Mindoro, Soledad, against quarry operators in the Municipality of San Jose. These operators were conducting quarrying activities based on Extraction Permits issued by the then Municipal Mayor, Jose Tapales Villarosa (petitioner), but lacked the necessary extraction permit from the Provincial Governor. Petitioner, upon learning of the CDOs, wrote letters asserting that the Municipality would not obey them until the Provincial Government observed proper legal processes for amending the Provincial Tax Ordinance and respecting municipal autonomy. PENRO Soledad explained that the CDOs were justified under the existing Provincial Tax Ordinance and Section 138 of the Local Government Code, which vests exclusive authority to issue extraction permits in the Provincial Governor. Petitioner persisted in his position. Consequently, a complaint was filed against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman for various offenses including Usurpation of Authority and Violation of the Local Government Code. The Ombudsman, however, found probable cause for nine counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and directed the filing of corresponding Informations. The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner. After the Court denied petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration with finality and directed entry of judgment, the ponencia, acting on a second motion for reconsideration, decided to acquit petitioner.

ISSUE

Whether the ponencia erred in acquitting petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa of nine counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

RULING

The dissenting opinion respectfully dissents from the ponencia’s decision to acquit. The dissent argues that: (1) The Office of the Ombudsman has the quasi-judicial prerogative and full discretion to determine what crime to charge based on its investigation, and is not bound by the complainant’s designation of the offense. The sufficiency of an Information is determined by the factual recitals therein, not its caption or the prosecutor’s conclusion of law. (2) The acts committed by petitioner, as alleged in the Informations and proven, constitute the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, not merely the lesser offense of Usurpation of Authority. The elements are: the accused is a public officer; the act was done in the discharge of official, administrative, or judicial functions; the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and the act caused undue injury to any party or gave any private party unwarranted benefits. The dissent contends that petitioner, a public officer, acted with evident bad faith by knowingly issuing extraction permits without authority, in violation of a clear legal provision (Section 138 of the Local Government Code), after being informed of his lack of authority, thereby causing undue injury to the government by depriving it of revenue and giving unwarranted benefits to the permittees. The dissent further criticizes the procedural irregularity of entertaining a second motion for reconsideration after a denial with finality and entry of judgment.