GR 232737; (October, 2019) (Digest)
G.R. No. 232737, October 2, 2019
People of the Philippines, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and Rico Rey S. Holganza, Respondents.
FACTS
The City of Cebu implemented a medium-rise, low-cost condominium project. Following reports of irregularities, the Ombudsman-Visayas requested an inquiry. On April 19, 2000, the COA Regional Office VII submitted its fact-finding report to the Ombudsman-Visayas, which was upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against several respondents, including Rico Rey S. Holganza, a former city councilor and member of the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC). On July 4, 2000, the Ombudsman-Visayas ordered respondents to file counter-affidavits. A Resolution dated March 20, 2002, recommended filing an information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Holganza and others. This was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas on August 14, 2002. The Resolution underwent further reviews under successive Ombudsmen. The information was finally approved on May 31, 2013, and filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 24, 2013. Holganza filed an Omnibus Motion, claiming he was not afforded the opportunity to submit a counter-affidavit as he was no longer in office when the order was issued. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and remanded the case for preliminary investigation. Holganza filed his counter-affidavit on August 19, 2014. On September 29, 2016, Holganza moved to dismiss the case on the ground of inordinate delay, arguing it took the Ombudsman-Visayas 12 years and 10 months from August 7, 2000, to June 24, 2013, to conclude the preliminary investigation, with an additional two-year delay from the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal case against Holganza on the ground of violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions. The Court held that the right to speedy disposition of cases is violated when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The Court applied a factual balancing test, considering: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. The length of delay, reckoned from the filing of the complaint on August 7, 2000, was beyond the reasonable period for determining probable cause. The prosecution failed to provide a credible, persuasive, and valid justification for the delay. The Court noted that changes in the Ombudsman’s leadership and the alleged voluminous records did not suffice as justifications, as the Ombudsman is constitutionally mandated to act promptly. Holganza timely asserted his right. In the absence of sufficient justification for the delay and given the timely invocation of the right, the dismissal of the criminal case for inordinate delay was upheld.
