GR 232094; (July, 2019) (Digest)
G.R. No. 232094 , July 24, 2019
Parina R. Jabinal, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Respondent
FACTS
The Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint against petitioner Atty. Parina R. Jabinal, a Division Manager at the National Housing Authority (NHA), for violating Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards). The complaint alleged that in 2008, while serving as a legal officer, she notarized a Deed of Sale and a Deed of Assignment involving NHA transactions and received payment, without prior written authority from the NHA. A certification also stated she was not a commissioned notary public for Quezon City in 2008.
In her defense, Jabinal claimed she had been a notary public from 2004-2010. She asserted that her notarization of the documents in 2008 was done in good faith, based on an honest belief that her notarial commission for 2008-2009 was pending and continuing from her prior commission. She argued that notarizing documents for the NHA was part of her official duties and did not constitute the prohibited “private practice of law,” which requires a habitual holding out of oneself as a lawyer for compensation.
ISSUE
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. 6713.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman. The Court reiterated its policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause, which is based on its constitutional investigatory powers. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, which was not present here.
The Ombudsman correctly found probable cause based on the elements of the offense. First, petitioner was a public official. Second, she engaged in the private practice of her profession. The Court has consistently ruled that notarization is a practice of law, and performing it for a fee constitutes private practice. Third, she did so without the required written authority from her agency head, as mandated by R.A. 6713 and relevant administrative issuances. Her claim of good faith and that the act was part of her official duties is a matter of defense best ventilated during trial, not a ground to negate probable cause at the investigatory stage. The Ombudsman’s determination that her acts fell within the prohibition was a valid exercise of discretion.