GR 230953; (June, 2018) (Digest)
G.R. No. 230953. June 20, 2018.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND CRISTINA V. ASTUDILLO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS – CEBU CITY AND FORMER JUDGE MA. LORNA P. DEMONTEVERDE, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS
Retired Judge Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde served in various government agencies from 1963 to 1995 before joining the Judiciary, where she served until her compulsory retirement in 2011. Upon her judicial retirement, she applied for and received her full retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended, which covered her entire government service, including her pre-judiciary years. Separately, she applied with the GSIS for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291 for her 32 years of service outside the Judiciary. The GSIS Board of Trustees initially granted her application but ruled that the accrual date of her R.A. No. 8291 benefits would be February 22, 2011, her actual date of retirement.
Demonteverde filed a motion for partial reconsideration, arguing her benefits under R.A. No. 8291 should accrue from the date she turned 60 years old, even though she was still actively serving as a judge at that time. The GSIS Board denied her motion. Demonteverde then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which granted her petition and ordered the GSIS to compute her benefits from the date she turned 60. The GSIS filed the present petition, arguing the CA committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Demonteverde’s retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291 should accrue from the date she turned 60, and not from her actual date of separation from government service.
RULING
No, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision. The legal logic hinges on the correct interpretation of the term “retirement” under R.A. No. 8291. The GSIS argued that “retirement” means actual separation from service. However, the Court clarified that for the purpose of accruing benefits under R.A. No. 8291, a member is deemed retired upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 or the optional retirement age of 60, provided they have rendered at least 15 years of service. This is a distinct concept from the act of physical separation.
Demonteverde turned 60 in 2005 while still serving as a judge. At that point, she had already rendered more than 15 years of government service under the GSIS. Therefore, she had already qualified for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291. Her subsequent continuation in judicial service did not disqualify her or suspend the accrual of her entitlement under that law. The computation of her benefits under R.A. No. 8291 is separate from and unaffected by her judicial retirement under R.A. No. 910. The two retirement systems provide distinct benefits for different periods of service. Consequently, her benefits under R.A. No. 8291 rightfully accrued from the date she met the age and service qualifications—when she turned 60—and not from her later physical separation. The CA’s ruling was legally sound and not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
