G.R. No. L-22795. January 31, 1977.
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and JAMES G. GAYOT, petitioners, vs. HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Pampanga, and LAWRENCE HELLER, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Lawrence Heller, an American citizen and Airman First Class stationed at Clark Air Base in Pampanga, filed a damages suit against petitioners Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. and its driver, James G. Gayot, with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The action arose from a vehicular accident that occurred in Benguet, Mountain Province, where Heller’s motorcycle was struck by a Dangwa bus. In his complaint, Heller alleged he was “presently assigned and stationed at Clark Air Base, Pampanga, Philippines.”
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on grounds of improper venue. They argued that under Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, a personal action must be filed in the province where the plaintiff or defendant resides. They contended that Heller, as a member of the U.S. Air Force subject to reassignment, only had a temporary station in Pampanga and was not a resident there for venue purposes. They asserted the proper venue should be Baguio City or Benguet, where the defendant driver resided. The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that Heller’s actual residence at Clark Air Base was sufficient to lay venue in Pampanga.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance of Pampanga committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss, thereby holding that venue was properly laid in Pampanga based on Heller’s actual residence there.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the respondent judge’s order. The legal logic centers on the interpretation of “residence” for purposes of venue under the Rules of Court. The Court clarified that the term “resides” in venue provisions pertains to the plaintiff’s actual residence or place of abode, not to his legal domicile in the technical sense. Residence, in this context, means the personal, physical habitation where a person actually lives, even if temporary, provided it is more than merely transitory.
The Court distinguished residence from domicile, noting that domicile requires an intention to remain permanently, whereas residence requires only bodily presence as an inhabitant. Applying this principle, Heller’s assignment and continuous stay at Clark Air Base constituted his actual residence at the time he filed the suit. There was no evidence that his abode there was inconsistent or temporary to the degree of being a mere fleeting presence. Consequently, he properly elected to file his personal action in Pampanga. The respondent judge correctly applied the rule designed for the convenience of the parties, and his denial of the motion to dismiss did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.