G.R. No. 227394, June 6, 2018
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Norjana Sood y Amatondin, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Norjana Sood was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. The prosecution alleged that on January 28, 2009, a buy-bust operation was conducted in Quezon City. A police officer, acting as a poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets of shabu from Sood after a pre-arranged signal. She was subsequently arrested. The marking of the seized items was done at the place of arrest, but the physical inventory and photographing were conducted later at a barangay hall in the presence of a barangay official and a media representative.
Sood presented a different version, claiming she was a sidewalk vendor apprehended by men she believed to be MMDA officers, who later demanded money for her release at the police station. The Regional Trial Court convicted Sood, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Both courts acknowledged deviations from the chain of custody procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 but ruled they constituted substantial compliance and did not impair the evidence’s integrity.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, considering the alleged non-compliance with the chain of custody requirements.
RULING
The Supreme Court ACQUITTED accused-appellant Norjana Sood. The Court emphasized that compliance with the chain of custody procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 is mandatory to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of seized drugs. The law requires the inventory and photographing to be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation at the place of arrest, or if not practicable, at the nearest police station or office, in the presence of specific witnesses.
The Court found that the prosecution failed to adhere to this procedure. The inventory was not conducted at the place of arrest or the nearest police station but at a barangay hall. More critically, the prosecution offered no justifiable reason for this deviation. The apprehending officers did not testify to any threatening circumstances that forced them to leave the scene, such as an unruly crowd or an emergency. The mere claim of “police operational procedure” was deemed insufficient to excuse the lapse. Consequently, the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti were compromised. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence accorded to the accused when the procedure designed to safeguard against tampering is unjustifiably ignored. Therefore, the guilt of the accused was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
