G.R. No. 226236. July 06, 2021.
DR. EMILY D. DE LEON, DR. MA. CORAZON RAMONA LL. DE LOS SANTOS, DEAN ATTY. JOE-SANTOS B. BISQUERA, ATTY. DIOSDADO G. MADRID AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS, VS. ATTY. JUDITH Z. LUIS, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

Petitioners filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against Ernesto de los Santos. A warrant for Ernesto’s arrest was issued. Atty. Judith Z. Luis was Ernesto’s counsel of record in that case. On February 13, 2013, and June 7, 2013, Atty. Luis rendered legal services to Ernesto and performed notarial functions on his pleadings in her office in Pasig City. Petitioners alleged that Atty. Luis, knowing of the standing warrant, failed to arrest Ernesto or report his presence to the authorities. Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint for Obstruction of Justice under Section 1(e) of Presidential Decree No. 1829 against Atty. Luis and her associate, claiming their failure to effect a citizen’s arrest delayed the prosecution and obstructed the service of process.
The Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office approved the filing of an Information against Atty. Luis. After various motions and inhibitions by several Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) judges, the case was eventually raffled to Judge Eduardo Ramon Reyes. Judge Reyes, affirming an earlier order, dismissed the complaint for want of probable cause, finding no proof that Atty. Luis assisted Ernesto with the sole purpose of helping him evade prosecution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which denied the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the MeTC. Petitioners then elevated the case directly to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE

Whether the RTC correctly found that the MeTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the charge for obstruction of justice against Atty. Luis, and specifically, whether Atty. Luis’s failure to arrest her client or report his presence to the authorities, despite knowledge of a standing warrant, constitutes obstruction of justice under Section 1(c) of P.D. No. 1829.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition, affirming the dismissal of the obstruction of justice charge against Atty. Luis. The Court held that the MeTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
The Court resolved that Atty. Luis’s actions did not constitute “harboring” or “concealing” under Section 1(c) of P.D. No. 1829. The provision penalizes acts knowingly or willfully obstructing the apprehension of suspects, and paragraph (c) specifically requires “harboring or concealing… any person… in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.” The Court agreed with the MeTC’s finding that harboring presupposes a deliberate act and requires an overt act evidencing intent to help the fugitive remain in violation of the law. The element of intent to frustrate or delay apprehension is explicit in the law.
In this case, there was no showing that Ernesto’s presence in Atty. Luis’s office was for any purpose other than to sign and swear to a Motion for Reconsideration. The fact that she did not arrest him or report him, without more, did not evince an unmistakable intent to help him evade justice. The Court noted that had her intention been to harbor or conceal Ernesto, she would not have asked him to come to her public notarial office in a busy business district. The Court emphasized the principle of strict construction of penal laws against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused, and the terms of the statute must clearly encompass the act committed. The act of a lawyer in continuing to represent a client with a standing warrant, by itself, does not constitute the crime of obstruction of justice.