GR 225353 54; (August, 2019) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. 225353-54. August 28, 2019.
RHEMA INTERNATIONAL LIVELIHOOD FOUNDATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HIBIX, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, YOSHIMITSU TAGUCHE, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
FACTS
On September 4, 2008, petitioner Rhema International Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (Rhema) filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Hibix, Inc. (Hibix). Rhema alleged it was the owner and in possession of a large tract of land by virtue of a donation. It claimed that on August 29, 2008, Hibix, together with armed men from the NBI, forcibly evicted Rhema’s personnel from the property. Hibix countered that it acquired the property from Philippine Fuji Xerox Corporation in 1999 and had been in possession since. Hibix alleged that on June 25, 2008, a group led by a certain Romeo Prado, claiming to be a special sheriff, and others, including a Julian Go, forcibly took over the property using a bogus writ of execution. Hibix lodged a complaint with the NBI, and on August 29, 2008, Hibix and the NBI retook possession of the property. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled in favor of Rhema, ordering Hibix to vacate and pay rent. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC’s finding that Rhema had prior physical possession from June 25, 2008, to August 29, 2008, but deleted the rental award. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the lower courts, dismissing the case. The CA held Rhema failed to establish prior physical possession because it had abandoned the property when the NBI investigated, and Hibix’s retaking of possession with NBI aid did not constitute the force or intimidation required for forcible entry.
ISSUE
Whether the elements of forcible entry are present.
RULING
Yes, the elements of forcible entry are present. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the CA Decision and Resolution, and reinstated the RTC Decision.
The elements of forcible entry are: (1) prior physical possession of the property by the plaintiff; and (2) unlawful deprivation of that possession by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat, or stealth. Possession in such cases refers only to physical possession or possession de facto, not legal possession or title. Prior physical possession need not be for an appreciable length of time.
The Court found that Hibix was in possession until June 25, 2008, when Rhema wrested possession from it. Hibix did not file a forcible entry case against Rhema. Instead, on August 29, 2008, Hibix, with the aid of the NBI and without a court order, forcibly retook possession. Therefore, Rhema had prior physical possession from June 25 to August 29, 2008. While Rhema initially used force to dispossess Hibix, the proper remedy for Hibix was to file a judicial action, not to resort to self-help by using the NBI to recover possession. This act of “putting the law into one’s hands” is precisely the evil sought to be prevented by the summary action of forcible entry, which aims to prevent breaches of the peace and compel parties to respect the legal process. The Court deferred to the RTC’s finding that Rhema failed to substantiate its claim for actual damages (rentals).
