GR 2160; (July, 1905) (Digest)
March 6, 2026GR 2229; (July, 1905) (Digest)
March 6, 2026G.R. No. 2249 : July 26, 1905
PARTIES:
Plaintiff-Appellee: The United States
Defendant-Appellant: Yu-To Chay
FACTS:
The appellant, Yu-To Chay, was charged with bribery for allegedly giving 70 pesos and a bicycle to Detective Ruperto Evaristo. The bribe was purportedly given to induce Evaristo to wrongfully arrest Aquilino Cueco on an unfounded charge, following personal animosity arising from a woman who left the appellant to live with Cueco.
The prosecution’s case relied entirely on the testimonies of two detectives, Marcelo Magsalin and Isaias Susana, who participated in the unlawful arrest and were thus accomplices. Susana’s testimony regarding the bicycle was hearsay, as he only saw Evaristo leave with it but did not hear any conversation about a gift. He also gave inconsistent statements between trials and was a convicted thief serving a sentence. The trial court found his testimony unworthy of belief.
The conviction, therefore, rested solely on Magsalin’s testimony. He claimed he twice collected money from the appellant on Evaristo’s behalf. However, he carried no credentials from Evaristo, and there was no evidence the appellant knew him. Magsalin was also a former detective serving a sentence for theft and robbery committed during his service.
ISSUE:
Whether the uncorroborated and questionable testimonies of accomplice witnesses are sufficient to sustain a conviction for bribery beyond a reasonable doubt.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction and acquitted the appellant.
The Court held that while a conviction can be based on the testimony of accomplices, such testimony must be credible and reliable. In this case, the primary witnesses were not only accomplices but also individuals of dubious character, having been convicted of crimes committed while in public service. Their testimonies were inconsistent, improbable, and lacked corroboration. The Court found the evidence insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted, and the costs of both instances were taxed de oficio.
