G.R. No. 224720-23 and G.R. No. 224765-68, February 2, 2021.
RICHARD T. MARTEL, ALLAN C. PUTONG, ABEL A. GUIÑARES, VICTORIA G. MIER, AND EDGAR C. GAN, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. / BENJAMIN P. BAUTISTA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

Petitioners Benjamin P. Bautista, Jr., Richard T. Martel, Allan C. Putong, Abel A. Guiñares, Victoria G. Mier, and Edgar C. Gan were found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The conviction stemmed from their involvement in the procurement of five motor vehicles for the use of the Governor and Vice-Governor of Davao del Sur without competitive bidding. The Sandiganbayan held that Bautista and Putong acted with manifest partiality by specifying particular vehicle brands in the Purchase Requests, while Martel, Guiñares, Mier, and Gan, as members of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC), were grossly negligent in concluding that direct purchase was justified under Section 371 of the Local Government Code.

ISSUE

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 to warrant the petitioners’ conviction.

RULING

No. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the elements of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and the element of giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference.
The concurring opinion, agreeing with the ponencia, held that while petitioners erred in relying on Section 371 of the Local Government Code for direct purchase, such error did not rise to the level of criminality punishable under R.A. No. 3019. The elements of the offense are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of official functions; (3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the public officer caused undue injury or gave unwarranted benefits. Although the first two elements were present, the last two were not sufficiently established.
On the third element, there was no “manifest partiality,” defined as a clear inclination to favor one side. Mere allegation of preferential treatment is insufficient. There was also no “gross inexcusable negligence,” defined as a want of even slight care, acting with conscious indifference. Petitioners honestly believed direct purchase was proper, as the Provincial Government had previously acquired seven vehicles through direct purchase without question from the Commission on Audit (COA), and they had sought COA advice. Their mistake was not brazen or flagrant negligence.
On the fourth element, there was no proof that the concerned companies received “unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference.” There was no showing the vehicles were overpriced or that petitioners received any pecuniary benefit. The Sandiganbayan itself noted “there is no proof of injury to the government.”
Bad faith is never presumed, and the accused enjoy the presumption of innocence. The prosecution’s evidence failed to meet the required moral certainty for conviction. Therefore, petitioners are entitled to acquittal.