G.R. No. 220904, September 25, 2019
JEBSENS MARITIME, INC. AND HAPAG-LLOYD AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, PETITIONERS, VS. RUPERTO S. PASAMBA, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

Petitioners Jebsens Maritime, Inc. and Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft hired respondent Ruperto S. Pasamba as an Able Seaman on November 19, 2009. He boarded the vessel on December 21, 2009. On January 24, 2010, he began experiencing illness symptoms. On February 4, 2010, an on-shore physician in Japan diagnosed him with sinusitis, myringitis, vascular headache, and suspicion of unstable angina, recommending immediate repatriation. He was repatriated on February 5, 2010, and reported to the company-designated doctors on February 6, 2010. He was diagnosed with polysinusitis and bilateral mastoiditis, undergoing two mastoidectomy surgeries on February 25, 2010, and May 14, 2010. On July 9, 2010 (154 days after repatriation), the company-designated doctors issued a Certificate declaring him “fit for work.” In November 2011, respondent secured re-employment as an Able Seaman with another agency. On July 31, 2012, an independent doctor diagnosed him with hearing loss. Respondent filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits on August 13, 2012. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the disability claim but awarded sickness allowance and attorney’s fees. The NLRC reversed, awarding permanent total disability benefits, additional sickness allowance, and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC with modification on the sickness allowance period.

ISSUE

1. Is respondent entitled to permanent and total disability benefits?
2. Is respondent entitled to sickness allowance from repatriation until final assessment of the company-designated doctors?
3. Is respondent entitled to attorney’s fees?

RULING

1. No, respondent is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. The Court ruled that the mere inability to work for more than 120 days does not automatically constitute permanent total disability. Citing Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. and subsequent jurisprudence, the Court held that when the seafarer requires further medical treatment, the company-designated physician has up to 240 days to issue a final assessment. The declaration of fitness to work on the 154th day was within this extended period. The fact that respondent was able to work again for another principal over a year later corroborates the fitness assessment. The earlier ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad was deemed superseded on this point.
2. Yes, respondent is entitled to sickness allowance from repatriation until the final assessment. The Court upheld the award of sickness allowance for the entire period of treatment until respondent was declared fit to work on July 9, 2010. This is based on Section 20(A), paragraph 3 of the POEA-SEC, which entitles a seafarer to sickness allowance for up to 120 days, extendable to 240 days if hospitalization or treatment is necessary. The provision in the CBA limiting sickness pay to 130 days cannot prevail as it is contrary to law and jurisprudence.
3. Yes, respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. The Court found no ground to disturb the uniform findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA in awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to Article 2208(8) of the Civil Code, which allows such awards in actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws.
DISPOSITIVE:
The petition was partly granted. The Court of Appeals Decision was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, deleting the award of permanent and total disability benefits, while the awards for sickness allowance and attorney’s fees were upheld.