G.R. No. 219157. August 14, 2019.
ZENAIDA E. SILVER AND NELSON SALCEDO, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, LORETO HAO, KENNETH HAO, ATTY. AMADO L. CANTOS, ZENAIDA TALATTAD AND MAUREEN ELLA M. MACASINDIL, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioner Zenaida Silver, engaged in the buy-and-sell of vehicles, won an auction at the Bureau of Customs. She borrowed the bid money from respondent Loreto Hao, executing a Memorandum of Agreement and a Deed of Absolute Sale over the vehicles in his favor as security. Hao paid the bid price directly to the Bureau. The vehicles were stored in a compound, and Silver authorized Hao’s nephew, Kenneth Hao, via a Special Power of Attorney, to sell them. A dispute arose when Silver alleged that Kenneth Hao sold numerous vehicles without accounting for the proceeds and that Hao caused vehicles to be registered in the names of other respondents. Silver rescinded the SPA and filed a complaint for carnapping, among others.
In turn, Loreto Hao filed a counter-complaint for carnapping against Silver and others, including petitioner Nelson Salcedo, alleging that Silver, with Salcedo’s assistance, forcibly took several vehicles from the compound. The Department of Justice found probable cause for carnapping against Silver and Salcedo. The trial court, upon a petition for review, issued warrants for their arrest. The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of probable cause, prompting this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the finding of probable cause for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act against petitioners.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court’s ruling. The Court held that the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a judicial function, distinct from the executive determination of probable cause for prosecution. In this judicial determination, the judge personally evaluates the prosecution’s evidence to decide whether there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty. The judge is not required to exhaustively examine the defense’s evidence at this stage, as a full-blown trial is the proper venue for a complete examination of the parties’ claims.
Here, the trial judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The judge examined the resolution and evidence from the Department of Justice, which included affidavits and documents indicating that the vehicles, claimed to be owned by Hao by virtue of the Deed of Sale, were allegedly taken by Silver and Salcedo through force and intimidation. This constituted a prima facie showing of the elements of carnapping—the taking of a motor vehicle with the use of violence or intimidation. The conflicting claims of ownership between Silver and Hao did not negate probable cause, as the issue of who had a better right of possession is evidentiary and best resolved at trial. The judicial finding of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest was thus proper.