G.R. No. 217126 , November 10, 2015
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

The Ombudsman issued a joint order on March 10, 2015, preventively suspending respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., then Mayor of Makati City, along with other city officers and employees. They were administratively charged with grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in connection with alleged irregularities in public procurement. The Ombudsman found the evidence of guilt strong and that the charges warranted removal or that Binay’s stay in office could prejudice the case. Binay assailed this order via a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing it was issued with grave abuse of discretion because it contravened the doctrine of condonation and the evidence of guilt was not strong. He prayed for and was granted a temporary restraining order and later a writ of preliminary injunction by the CA. The CA relied on the doctrine of condonation, citing Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, reasoning that if the alleged acts were committed in a prior term and the official was re-elected, he could no longer be administratively charged. The Ombudsman filed a petition, arguing the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. In her pleadings, the Ombudsman contended the condonation doctrine was irrelevant to the issuance of a preventive suspension order, as it was merely a matter of defense to be raised in the proper administrative proceeding, not at the preliminary stage.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction against the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order based on the doctrine of condonation.
2. Whether the Supreme Court should re-examine and abandon the doctrine of condonation in this case.

RULING

Justice Bersamin, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
1. He CONCURRED with the main opinion’s declaration of the ineffectiveness of the first paragraph and the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), as it authorized undue interference with the courts’ prerogatives.
2. He DISSENTED regarding the main opinion’s re-examination and abandonment of the doctrine of condonation. He argued that the controversy did not call for a revisit of the doctrine, and doing so without the premise of justiciability would be an indulgence in conjecture. He agreed with the Ombudsman’s position that the doctrine of condonation was a matter of defense relevant only to the imposition of an administrative penalty, not to the issuance of a preventive suspension order, which is a preliminary step. The question of whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the injunction could be settled by reference to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 on preventive suspension, not by overturning the condonation doctrine.