G.R. No. 216603, December 5, 2023
JAIME MANUEL N. LEGARDA, PETITIONER, VS. CLERK OF COURT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY AND BENJAMIN CALAWAGAN, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioner Jaime Manuel N. Legarda filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (COC-RTC) to issue a Final Certificate of Sale in his favor. The property in question was sold at a foreclosure sale to respondent Benjamin Calawagan as the highest bidder. During the redemption period, Calawagan assigned all his rights and interests under the Certificate of Sale to Legarda via a Deed of Assignment, which was annotated on the title. After the redemption period lapsed, Legarda demanded the issuance of the Final Certificate of Sale.
The COC-RTC refused, contending that the issuance of such a certificate to an assignee is not provided for under the Rules of Court and involves the exercise of judgment beyond a ministerial duty. The Regional Trial Court granted Legarda’s mandamus petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. The CA held that mandamus did not lie, prompting Legarda to elevate the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the Clerk of Court has a clear, ministerial duty to issue a Final Certificate of Sale directly to the assignee of the purchaser at a foreclosure sale.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals. The ponencia, with which Chief Justice Gesmundo concurred, held that mandamus cannot compel the COC-RTC to issue the certificate to Legarda. The legal logic centers on the interpretation of Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the issuance of a final deed after an execution sale. This provision states that only the “purchaser” or the “last redemptioner” is entitled to the conveyance and possession of the property upon the expiration of the redemption period.
Critically, the Court emphasized that the 1997 Rules deliberately deleted the word “assignee,” which was expressly included in the precursor provision (Section 35 of the 1964 Rules). This deletion was not superfluous but intentional, designed to limit the right to directly obtain the final conveyance from the court officer solely to the original purchaser or the last redemptioner. An assignee, while acquiring rights from the purchaser, is not a party to the original foreclosure proceedings and holds no independent right of redemption. Therefore, the assignee’s right to the certificate is not “indubitably granted by law” as required for mandamus to lie.
Consequently, the duty of the Clerk of Court in issuing the Final Certificate of Sale is not ministerial when the claimant is an assignee. Issuing it would require the court officer to look beyond the foreclosure records and adjudicate the validity of the assignment—a function involving discretion and judgment. The proper remedy for Legarda is to have the Final Certificate of Sale issued to the original purchaser, Calawagan, and then to enforce his rights under the Deed of Assignment through a separate appropriate action for conveyance.