GR 214986; (February, 2017) (Digest)
G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017
ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., Petitioner, vs. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF, GEN. GREGORIO PIO CATAPANG, BRIG GEN. ARTHUR ANG, CAMP AGUINALDO CAMP COMMANDER, and LT. COL. HAROLD CABUNOC, AFP PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE CHIEF, Respondents.
FACTS
This is a Petition to Cite for Indirect Contempt filed by petitioner Atty. Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr. against several AFP officials. The petition stemmed from the custody of US Marine Private Joseph Scott Pemberton, the suspect in the killing of Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude. On October 22, 2014, petitioner, along with the Laude family and a German national, went to Camp Aguinaldo to demand to see Pemberton, who was detained in a facility within the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board (MDB-SEB) compound.
Respondents alleged that petitioner and his group forcibly entered the camp. Military personnel attested that petitioner’s vehicle ignored a checkpoint and sped into the camp. At the MDB-SEB perimeter, petitioner’s group, accompanied by media, pushed through a gate despite being told to wait for the Public Affairs Office. Respondents further claimed that petitioner incited his clients to scale the perimeter fence and hurled invectives at the military personnel. Following the incident, respondent Lt. Col. Harold Cabunoc issued a press statement stating the AFP Chief of Staff was considering filing a disbarment complaint against petitioner.
ISSUE
Whether the respondents’ act of publicly announcing the consideration of disbarment proceedings against the petitioner constitutes indirect contempt of court.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The power to disbar is judicial in nature, but the act of considering or threatening to file an administrative complaint does not, by itself, constitute contempt. The Court distinguished between the act of filing a complaint, which is a citizen’s right, and the act of publicly announcing an intent to file, which may be ethically questionable but is not automatically contemptuous.
The legal logic is grounded in the definition of indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. For an act to be punishable as indirect contempt, it must be shown to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. The respondents’ statement was a reaction to petitioner’s alleged misconduct during the camp incident. It did not directly involve any pending court proceeding at that time, nor did it exhibit a clear intent to influence or pressure the court in its judicial functions. The Court emphasized that while such public statements by government officials should be circumspect, they do not rise to the level of contempt without a clear showing of an actual obstruction of justice. The proper remedy for the petitioner, if aggrieved by the statements, was not a contempt proceeding but potentially an administrative or civil action for any alleged violation of his rights.