GR 98182; (March, 1993) (Digest)
March 12, 2026AC 7919; (October, 2014) (Digest)
March 12, 2026G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014
EMILIO RAMON “E.R.” P. EJERCITO, Petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR “EGAY” S. SAN LUIS, Respondents.
FACTS
Three days before the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, private respondent Edgar “Egay” S. San Luis filed a petition for disqualification against petitioner Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, a gubernatorial candidate and incumbent Governor of Laguna. The petition alleged two causes of action. First, that Ejercito distributed “Orange Cards” to the electorate with the intent to influence voters, constituting a violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code for giving material consideration. Second, that Ejercito exceeded the authorized campaign expenditure limit under COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Fair Election Act rules), as his television campaign commercials alone allegedly cost ₱23,730,784, exceeding the allowable limit of ₱4,576,566 for Laguna’s 1,525,522 registered voters. Ejercito was proclaimed the duly-elected Governor of Laguna on May 17, 2013. The COMELEC First Division granted the disqualification petition on September 26, 2013, and the COMELEC En Banc affirmed this decision on May 21, 2014. Ejercito filed the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner Ejercito.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the COMELEC resolutions. The Court held that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. On the first cause of action, the “Orange Card” was a health program initiated during Ejercito’s prior term as Governor, not during the campaign period. Its distribution was not shown to be for the purpose of influencing voters, and the evidence presented (witness statements) was hearsay. On the second cause of action, the allegation of overspending was based solely on a published rate card for television advertisements, which is not conclusive proof of actual expenditures. The COMELEC relied on mere assumptions without requiring evidence of actual payments or costs incurred by the candidate. Furthermore, the petition for disqualification was improperly filed as it was essentially a complaint for election offenses which, under the rules, should have been initiated before the COMELEC Law Department or other designated officials, not directly as a disqualification case. The COMELEC’s finding of guilt was not supported by substantial evidence.
