G.R. No. L-21104, May 31, 1971
BCI EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION (PAFLU), petitioner, vs. HON. PIO MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Baguio City and BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, BCI Employees and Workers Union (PAFLU), was certified as the new sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the rank-and-file workers of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. on August 18, 1962, replacing the former agent, Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union. The prior collective bargaining agreement contained a union security clause requiring the company to deduct union dues from employees’ wages and remit them to the incumbent certified bargaining agent. Following the certification, another union that had participated in the election, the Bobok Lumber Jack Association, filed a complaint for declaratory relief with the Court of First Instance of Baguio. The Association sought a declaration that the company and the new union could not continue the union shop arrangement and requested a preliminary injunction to stop the deduction and remittance of union dues. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction.
The respondent company and the petitioner union filed motions to lift the preliminary injunction. During a hearing, the parties agreed that the company would resume deductions but hold the funds in trust pending the court’s resolution. The trial court approved this arrangement in an order dated September 28, 1962. Subsequently, the petitioner union also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on grounds including lack of cause of action and the court’s lack of jurisdiction. However, before the trial court could resolve either the motions to lift the injunction or the motion to dismiss, the petitioner union filed the instant petition for certiorari directly with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme Court is proper and ripe for adjudication.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being prematurely filed. The legal logic is anchored on the fundamental doctrine governing the extraordinary writ of certiorari. For certiorari to be an available remedy, there must generally be a final order or resolution from the lower court, and the aggrieved party must have exhausted other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies available in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the petitioner bypassed the trial court while its motions were still pending resolution. The issues raised—specifically, the trial court’s jurisdiction over the declaratory relief action and the validity of the preliminary injunction—were precisely the subjects of the unresolved motions to dismiss and to lift. The Supreme Court emphasized that certiorari is not proper when the remedies sought are still available in the lower court. Furthermore, the Court noted that a motion for reconsideration should typically be filed first to allow the lower court an opportunity to correct its own errors. The petition was also deemed procedurally infirm because it raised factual issues requiring evidence not fully presented in the pleadings before the Supreme Court. Thus, the dismissal was based on the failure to observe the hierarchy of courts and the prerequisite exhaustion of remedies at the trial level.