G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970
J.M. TUASON and CO., INC., petitioner-appellee, vs. THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents-appellants.

FACTS

This case involves a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. to permanently enjoin the respondents from instituting expropriation proceedings against its property, the “Tatalon Estate,” as specifically authorized by Republic Act No. 2616. In 1961, the Court upheld a preliminary injunction against the filing of such proceedings pending the resolution of the prohibition case on the merits. The lower court had granted the petitioner’s petition, which the main decision now reverses, thereby allowing the respondents to file the corresponding expropriation proceedings.

ISSUE

The primary legal issue, as framed in the concurring and dissenting opinion, is whether the Court, in deciding the prohibition case, can and should preemptively rule on the validity of the petitioner’s objections and defenses to the expropriation, or whether these matters should be properly litigated in the expropriation proceedings yet to be instituted.

RULING

Justice Teehankee, in a concurring and dissenting opinion joined by Justices J.B.L. Reyes and Castro, concurs in the result of the main opinion to the extent that it reverses the lower court’s decision and lifts the injunction, thereby permitting the respondents to initiate expropriation proceedings. However, he dissents from any portion of the main opinion that tends to prematurely judge the petitioner’s objections and defenses. The opinion holds that the relevant facts and circumstances are not properly and adequately before the Court to rule on the substantive issues at this stage. Consequently, the decision does not foreclose the petitioner from raising proper and valid objections and defenses in the forthcoming expropriation proceedings, just as the respondents may adduce additional facts in support of their petition.
The opinion enumerates the principal issues that should be resolved in the expropriation proceedings:
1. The factual question of what portion of the “Tatalon Estate” remains unsold and available for expropriation, given conflicting claims between the petitioner and the Solicitor General.
2. The factual question of whether the remaining occupants on the property are “bona fide” occupants (the intended beneficiaries of R.A. No. 2616) or merely illegal squatters.
3. The need to first determine these factual questions before resolving the vital constitutional issues of the necessity of the taking and whether it is for public use.
4. The application of the constitutional provision on expropriation of landed estates (Article XIII, Section 4), noting that the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case must first be established before judgment.
5. The justiciability of Congress’s exercise of its expropriation power in singling out a specific property, and whether this complies with the due process and equal protection clauses, requiring judicial scrutiny based on a full factual record.
6. The guideline that the validity of expropriation depends on circumstances such as the size of the land, the number of people benefited, and the extent of social reform secured, indicating that the legislative appraisal of necessity is not foreclosed from judicial review.
7. The acknowledgment that existing contractual rights of purchasers of subdivided lots must be protected under the constitutional non-impairment clause. The opinion also suggests that the objectives of R.A. No. 2616 might be accomplished more expeditiously through direct purchase of unsold lots or financial assistance to occupants, rather than through expropriation, given that the owner is already selling the property.