G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015
MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA MARUHOM, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

FACTS

Petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta y Maruhom was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Violation of Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). The RTC sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, plus a fine, civil indemnity, and moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the conviction, finding petitioner guilty instead of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and imposed an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Petitioner received the CA Decision on July 6, 2012. Instead of appealing further, he filed a manifestation with motion before the CA on July 23, 2012, seeking to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC, invoking the case of Colinares v. People. The CA denied his motion, ruling that Colinares was inapplicable because, unlike in Colinares where the sole issue was the correctness of the penalty, petitioner herein had assailed the merits of his conviction. The CA found the case of Lagrosa v. People more appropriate, where probation was denied because the petitioners put in issue the merits of their conviction on appeal.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner, after having appealed his conviction and having the penalty reduced by the appellate court, is eligible to apply for probation.

RULING

The petition is denied. The Supreme Court held that petitioner is disqualified from applying for probation. Under Section 4 of the Probation Law (Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1990), no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. The law establishes that the filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. The Court emphasized that the Probation Law requires the defendant to apply for probation at the first opportunity, i.e., within the period for perfecting an appeal from the trial court’s judgment of conviction, and forego the right to appeal. By appealing the judgment of the RTC and challenging both his conviction and the penalty, petitioner elected to seek an acquittal or a reduction of penalty through the appellate process. Having pursued an appeal, he is barred from subsequently applying for probation, even though the appellate court later reduced his penalty to within the probationable range (not more than six years imprisonment). The policy is to prevent a situation where a defendant delays the administration of justice by appealing up to the Supreme Court only to apply for probation after the appeal is dismissed or the conviction is affirmed. The Court distinguished the case of Colinares, noting it involved a unique circumstance where the appeal was solely on the issue of the propriety of the penalty, which is not the situation here.