GR 205956; (February, 2014) (Digest)
G.R. No. 205956; February 12, 2014
P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA’O, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan, a respondent in a separate petition (G.R. No. 199462) seeking to upgrade homicide charges to murder for the 2005 Ortigas shooting deaths, filed this contempt petition against respondents Monique Cu-Unjieng La’O (a petitioner in G.R. No. 199462) and her counsel, Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno. The contempt charge arose from a press conference held on January 29, 2013, following a separate, highly publicized shooting incident in Atimonan, Quezon, where Marantan was the ground commander. During the televised interview, respondents criticized the perceived inaction of the Supreme Court on G.R. No. 199462, asserted that the Ortigas incident was a “rubout,” and declared that Marantan and his co-accused were guilty of murder.
Marantan alleged these statements violated the sub judice rule, constituting indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court for conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. He argued the press conference was orchestrated to influence the Court’s pending petition and the related criminal cases by drawing parallels to the Atimonan incident. Respondents countered that their statements were legitimate expressions of opinion on a matter of public concern, made without criminal intent, and that the petition aimed to stifle free speech.
ISSUE
Whether the respondents’ statements during the press conference constitute indirect contempt for violating the sub judice rule.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling the respondents’ statements did not constitute indirect contempt. The Court clarified that proceedings for indirect contempt are criminal in nature, requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt of conduct that directly or indirectly impedes, obstructs, or degrades justice. The sub judice rule restricts comments on pending judicial proceedings to prevent prejudgment or influence. However, not all commentary on a pending case is punishable.
The Court held that the respondents’ criticisms, while strong, were expressions of their frustration and desire for justice after eight years of litigation. Their comments did not pose a “serious and imminent threat” to the administration of justice, nor was there a showing of criminal intent to obstruct the proceedings. The Court emphasized that freedom of speech and the press retains constitutional protection even when concerning pending cases, provided it does not clearly and presently endanger the fair administration of justice. In borderline instances, this freedom must weigh heavily against a potential tendency to influence a case. The power to punish for contempt is drastic and should be used sparingly only when necessary for justice, a necessity absent here.